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INTRODUCTION

Judge Ginsburg has provided a judge's-eye view of the work of a United
States Court of Appeals in her Dunwody Lecture.' From her perspective as a
judge on the District of Columbia Circuit, she has done a fine job describing
the process of deciding appellate cases and composing a reasoned decision. 2 But
simply describing "things as they are" in the decisional process will not suffice
in this article for two reasons. First, Judge Ginsburg has already done that,
as have other judges.3 Second, one without personal experience in deciding
cases should maintain an academic orientation. The focus here will therefore
be on "things that never were" - proposals to reform the federal court system's
middle tier.
The emphasis is neither accidental nor merely expedient. As the bicentennial
of the First Judiciary Act 4 and the centennial of the courts of appeals approach,5
the federal courts have drawn renewed attention. Over the years, and most
6
recently, attention has been lavished on the Supreme Court and its problems.

..

G. BERNARD SHAW, BACK 7tO METHUSELHA -

A METABIOLOGICAL PENTATEUCH 7 (reprinted

ed. 1949). The line was made famous by President John Kennedy and was often rendered by
Senator Robert Kennedy in his campaign for the presidency. A. SCHLESINGER, ROBERT KENNEDY
AND His TIMES 886 n.* (1978).
1. Ginsburg, The Obligation to Reason Why, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 205 (1985).
2. Id. at 207-12.
3. Part of the common law tradition allows for judges to step back from their daily duties
and describe their decisionmaking process, often with provocative insights. See generally R. ALDISERT,
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1976) (edited readings); R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS - CRISIS AND
REFORM (1985). Judge Ginsburg and her generation of judges have continued the tradition. See,
e.g., Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections on Current Practice in Federal
Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385 (1983-84); Ginsburg, Inviting Judicial Activism: A
"Liberal" or "Conservative" Technique?, 15 GA. L. REV. 539 (1981). Rarer, but of growing significance, are the empirical evaluations by outsiders looking in. See, e.g., Wasby, Oral Argument in the
Ninth Circuit: The View From Bench and Bar, 11 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 21 (1981).
4. Act of Septmber 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
5. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
6. See, e.g., Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal Courts:
A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 IOWA L. REV. 871, 891-93 (1983);
Handler, What to Do With the Supreme Court's Burgeoning Calendar?, 5 CARDOZO L. REV. 249 (1984);
Hellman, The Business of the Supreme Court Under the Judiciary Act of 1925: The Plenary Docket in the
1970's, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1711 (1978); Rehnquist, A Plea for Help: Solutions to Serious Problems
Currently Experienced by the FederalJudicial System, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1984); Note, Of High Designs:
A Compendium of Proposals to Reduce the Workload of the Supreme Court, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1307 (1983).
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Understanding the middle tier, however, is the key to understanding the system
because changes in the intermediate7 federal courts have reflected an evolution
in the entire federal courts system.
Since 1891 the role and function of the intermediate tier has been constant,
merely considered as a matter of statute. 8 Yet, the mind reels from a centennial
glimpse back at the social, economic and legal changes since those federal courts
were created. Now, those pent up pressures for court reform show signs of
overwhelming the venerable statutory framework, again suggesting that "great
judiciary act," unlike great poems, are not written for all times. 9 Prominent
commentators have noted that the courts of appeals have felt the greatest pressure.' 0 Statistics bear out this conclusion. Filings in each of the three levels
have increased in the last twenty years. While the civil filings in the district
courts have increased by slightly more than a factor of three and the Supreme
Court's docket has increased by less than a factor of three, filings in the courts
of appeals have increased by nearly a factor of six." Despite periodic increases
in the number of judges, present judgepower and administrative techniques
under existing jurisdictional statutes are being taxed to the limit. Undue delay
and backlogs are not the only costs of this situation. Also at risk is the important
role the courts of appeals play in our federal system. Understandably, proposals
for reforms have been growing in number and in urgency.
This essay considers first the ideal role of the intermediate court in the
federal judicial institution. Against this ideal, fhe article explores the seriousness
of the threat presented by workload growth. IThe focus of this presentation is
2
on reform. Intramural reforms are distinguished from extramural reforms.'
Intramural reforms, both accomplished and proposed, involve changes in how
the courts of appeals themselves choose to perform within their traditional role
itself. Extramural reforms, both accomplished and proposed, involve congressional changes in the role. A few editorials have been included along the way,

7.

Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687, 688
Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Deciris in the Divided Fifth

(1981).
8. See generally id. at 736-37 (Chronological Table of Federal Circuits).
9. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINEss OF THE SUPREME COURT, A STUDY OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 107 (1927).

10. See, e.g., Griswold, Cutting the Clock to Fit the Cloth: An Approach to Problems in the Federal
Courts, 32 CATH. U.L. REv. 787, 796 (1983) ("[T]he problem of burden on the courts is substantial
and serious, and... the place where it most significantly impinges is on the United States Courts
of Appeals."); Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of Appeals, 1973

U.L.Q. 257, 257 ("The federal intermediate appellate system is on the verge of ceasing to
function as an effective administrator of justice."). More than a decade ago, Justice Douglas opined,
"[i]f there are any courts that are surfeited, they are the courts of appeals." Tidewater Oil Co. v.
United States, 409 U.S. 151, 176 (1972). See generally infra text accompanying notes 39-112.
11. Feinberg, Constraining "The Least Dangerous Branch". The Tradition of Attacks on JudicialPower,
59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 252, 275 (1984). See generally infra; text accompanying notes 39-112.
12. For other dassifications of proposed solutions, see generally J. MARTIN & E. PRSCOTr,
APPELLATE COURT DELAY 6-17 (1981); Note, supra note 6, at 1308-10.
WAsH.
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expressing preferences for one type of reform and for some choices within each
type.
One final note concerning the article's approach merits an introductory mention. This essay discusses most all of the reforms that have been tried or
proposed in the various courts of appeals. Those separate institutions are quite
different, however, and likely will remain so unless a major structural extramural
reform occurs. The First Circuit, with a handful of judges and a small geographic area, is quite different from the large and vast Ninth Circuit. The
Second Circuit has a docket concentrated in one city. The District of Columbia
Circuit bears a burdensome docket originating in the federal seat of government.
Not all of the problems noted are found in each court of appeals, and the
proposed reforms are not universal. Still, some value exists in collecting these
proposals in one place; in short, in compiling a compendium.
II.

THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS

No apologies are necessary for beginning with the "ought." Later discussion
will deal with the courts of appeals as they have evolved into their present
state. For now the essay is concerned with the received wisdom of appellate
ideals. This discussion serves as some measure for what has been done, what
is left to be done, and what cannot be done about the intermediate federal
court. 13

While many authors have sought to describe the ideal appellate function in
various formulations, contemporary writers must concede that Karl Llewellyn
14
and Roscoe Pound have "long ago uttered every pertinent observation.'
Llewellyn and Pound taught that the dual appellate functions are correction of
error (or pronouncing correctness) in particular litigation and declaration of law
by creation, clarification, elaboration, or overruling.' 5 Professors Carrington,

13. Justice Holmes once wrote of ideals, "[ilt often is a merit of an ideal to be unattainable.
Its being so keeps forever before us something more to be done, and saves us from the ennui of
a monotonous perfection." Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARv. L. REV. 443, 463
(1899).
14.

P.

CARRINGTON,

inafter cited as P.
DECIDING APPEALS

D.

MEADOR & M.

CARRINGTON].
11-15 (1960);

ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 8 n.21 (1976) [here-

See generally K.
R.

LLEWELYN,

THE COMMON

POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE

LAW TRADITION

IN CIVIL CASES

1-2

-

(1941);

Pound, Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 40 AM. U.L. REV. 729
(1906).
15. P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 2-3. See generally T. MARVEL, APPELLATE COURTS AND
LAWYERS (1978); D. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS STAFF AND PROCESS IN THE CRISIS OF VOLUME
(1974); A.B.A. COMM'N ON STANDARD:; OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS (Approved Draft 1977); A.B.A. COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION (Tent. Draft 1973); Parker, Improving Appellate Methods, 25 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1950).
From time to time, thoughtful scholars have challenged the excesses of the received wisdom. See, e.g.,

Leflar, The Multi-Judge Decisional Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 722 (1983) (recapitulation of sound
appellate practices); Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 779
(1957)

("I think we should refrain from agreeing that appellate courts are to do justice until we

have seen the price we must pay for this concept.").
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Meador and Rosenberg have listed the process imperatives that assure appellate

justice in terms of
judges who are impartial; are multi-partite; are identifiable, not anonymous, and not mere auxiliaries; think individually, but act collegially;
respect the interest of adversaries in being heard, but inform themselves
fully on the material issues, evidence, and law on which
decisions are
6
to be made; and announce their reasons for decisions.'
7
In other words, the process must be "visibly rational" so far as judges function.'
This is the process imperative.
Those same authors have reduced the appellate system's function to a black

letter ideal:

[Tihe system must provide uniform and coherent enunciation and application of the law; decisions that are expeditious, involving as few steps
as possible; working conditions for judges which attract lawyers of high
quality, who command professional respect; and working conditions for
judges which will foster their humane concern for individual litigants. 8
This is the ideal system function. The reality of the actual appellate function
and any proposed reform must be assessed asymptotically, as they approach
but never reach the ideal."' Furthering the present inquiry requires consideration
of how these attitudes about the ideal system function may be restated within
the context of our federal court system.
As for the dual appellate functions of correction and declaration, the courts
20
of appeals owe their origin to a congressional desire to provide only the former.
The correction function was alone the province of the courts of appeals in the
1891 design. Congress freed the Supreme Court from a duty to correct error
so that it could better perform the declaration function, which it alone was to
perform. With occasional lapses, the Supreme Court today remains true to the
1891 plan that it is not a court of error. 2' Indeed, the Judges Bill of 1925
reinforced this notion by reducing the Court's appellate docket. 22 Recent proposals would search out and destroy any vestiges of the correction function in
23
the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.
Consistent with their original design, the courts of appeals continue to function as the federal judicial institution for correction of error. Indeed, over the

16. P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 8-11. Judge Ginsburg describes the responsibility of
fairly getting in right. Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 206-07.
17. P. CARRINOTON, supra note 14, at 11.
18. Id. at 11-12.
19. Id.
20. When created, the courts of appeals were meant "to correct individual injustice and
control erroneous or lawless behaviour by judges or other officials while the Supreme Court [was

to] assure doctrinal coherence and national uniformity." Id. at 200.
21. Cf. Florida v. Rodriquez, 105 S. Ct. 308, 311-14 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. Act of February 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936.
23.

See generally Note, supra note 6.
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years the trend has been toward near complete reliance on the intermediate
courts to correct error, as greater demands have been placed on the federal
judicial institution at each level. 24 Significantly at odds with the original design,
however, the courts of appeals have come to share the declaration function with
the Supreme Court. 25 If not less fallible, at least these courts' decisions are
becoming more final in all areas of federal law. 26 Justice Rehnquist has agreed,
admitting that the courts of appeals' autonomy in performing the declaration
function has gone so far that the Supreme Court's supervisory authority has
been severely diminished. 27 The Court cannot accept a sufficient number of
2
appeals to allow it to impose national uniformity.
Considering the highest level of abstraction, the roles of the federal appellate
courts have changed. In the original scheme, the Supreme Court performed
both the declaration function and what limited correction function that was
contemplated. No intermediate tier existed. When the correction function became more important and the number of appeals threatened the Supreme Court's
own declaration duty, Congress created the intermediate appellate court to serve
as the court of error. In the modern era, the volume of appeals requires the
courts of appeals today to perform the declaration function, to a large extent,
free from Supreme Court supervision. Thus, events have overtaken design.
At the less abstract level of appellate function, the key concepts are process
imperatives and system function. The process imperative of visible rationality
and the ideal system function of procedural regularity may be recast to fit the
unique federal court system. While Professors Carrington, Meador and Rosenberg have gone far to set the terms of the general debate over appellate function,
the present discussion is concerned with the ideal role of the United States
Courts of Appeals.
Judge Wald, United States Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit, has identified five objectives of the federal judicial institution that articulate
a federal process imperative:

24. See generally Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function
of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 542 (1969). The perhaps greater significance of
this larger role for correction in the relationship between trial and appellate court is beyond the
scope of this article. See generally Wright, supra note 15.
25.

Justice White recently made the point:
The Supreme Court of the United States reviews only a small percentage of all judgments issued by the twelve courts of appeals. Each of the courts of appeals, therefore, is
for all practical purposes the final expositor of the federal law within its geographical
jurisdiction. This crucial fact makes each of those courts a tremendously important influence
in the development of the federal law, both constitutional and statutory.
White, Dedication - Fifih Circuit Symposium, 15 TEx. TEcH. L. REv. ix (1984).
26. This paraphrase is taken from Justice Jackson's aphorism: "We are not final because we
are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,
540 (1953). See also Baker, Constitutional Law, 27 Loy. L. REv. 805, 862 (1981).
27. Rehnquist, A Plea for Help: Solutions to Serious Problems Currently Experienced by the Federal
Judicial System, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 1, 4-5 (1984).
28. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol37/iss2/2
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First, we want to make correct decisions on the myriad cases and
motions they face. Basically, decisions should accurately reflect the facts
in the record and existing law on the subject. Ideally, we also should
aim to season the logic of our decisions with an understanding of realworld constraints on litigants (who are often government agencies in our
court), the public, and the judiciary.
Second, the courts' opinions should contain reasoned explanations of
their decisions to lend them legitimacy, permit public evaluation, and
impose a discipline on judges.
Third, courts should produce timely decisions and opinions, meaning,
quite candidly, that we should hold our feet to the fire.
Fourth, courts should strive for uniform decisions, especially, as in
our circuit, when one tribunal is composed of a number of separate
panels.
Fifth, the courts must bear in mind that, as the only unelected branch
of our Constitutional triad, they must act always to preserve and to
reinforce public confidence in their integrity. Historically, achievement
of this objective has required judges to walk a fine and precarious line:
to render decisions based on the facts and the law, resisting personal
bias toward individuals or groups, while preserving the values of the
judge's own2 9personal reasoning, experience, and ultimately, sense of responsibility.
For a federal version of the ideal system function, reliance may be placed
on the statement of conditions then professor Frankfurter believed "indispensable to a seasoned, collective judicial judgment":
1. Encouragement of oral argument; discouragement of oratory. The
Socratic method is applied; questioning, in which the whole Court freely
engage, clarifies the mind of the Justices as to the issues and guides the
cqurse of argument through real difficulties.
2. Consideration of every matter, be it an important case or merely
a minor motion, by every Justice before conference, and action at fixed,
frequent and long conferences of the Court. This assures responsible
deliberation and decision by the whole Court.
3. Assignment by the Chief Justice of cases for opinion-writing to
the different Justices after discussion and vote at conference. Flexible use
is thus made of the talents and energies of the Justices, and the writer
of the opinion enters upon the task not only with the knowledge of the
conclusions of his associates, but with the benefit of their suggestions
made at the conference.

29.

Wald, The Problem with the Courts: Black-Robed Bureaucracy, or Collegiality Under Challenge?,

42 MD. L. REv. 766, 768-69 (1983).
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4. Distribution of draft opinions in print, for consideration of them
by the individual Justices in advance of the conference and then their
discussion at subsequent conferences. Ample time is thus furnished for
care in formulation of result, and for writing dissents. This practice
makes for team play,
and encourages individual inquiry instead of sub30
servient unanimity.
Although Frankfurter presented this ideal for the Supreme Court, such an ideal
3
system function would fit the courts of appeals, at least roughly. '

30. F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, supra note 9, at vii-viii.
31.
Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CALIF. L.
REV. 937, 938 (1980). Professor Hellman states that co-author Frankfurter was the originator. Id.
at 938 n.1.
Of course, the comparison suffers when Justice Frankfurter's Supreme Court ideals are applied
to an intermediate court with mandatory review authority which sits in multiple panels and decides
thousands of appeals each year. Some accommodation of the ideal for the panel mechanism must
be made in this context. His generalization remains a helpful starting place.
Another helpful statement of the ideals or goals is found in T. MARVEL, supra note 15, at 243-44
(app. B):
At the outset it is best to have as a foundation a list of goals for appellate court
decision-making procedures. The major, overriding problem is how best to inform the
judges so that they can decide cases as well as possible within the time constraints. This
involves numerous subsidiary goals, but the list that follows is limited to those that have
traditionally been troublesome in appellate courts.
1. The judges should receive as much relevant information about the case as possible.
It is more important that information pertaining to the court's lawmaking function be
complete than that pertaining only to the dispute-deciding function, for lawmaking decisions
ordinarily have a greater impact on society. But the information, however used, should
be as free as possible from time-wasting extraneous material.
2. Each judge sitting on a case should know enough about it to make his own informed,
independent decision. He should delegate as little as possible to the judge assigned the
case and to law clerks and staff attorneys. This, of course, is a matter of degree; time
problems make delegation of independent research and study of the record necessary, and
delegation of the search for information necessarily means some delegation of decisionmaking.
3. Similarly, each judge should participate in the content of any opinion, especially if
published, with which he concurs (except for the details of writing style). A number of
minds can produce an opinion more serviceable to the bar than can one mind alone. So,
again, each judge must understand the case, and he must study and comment on draft
opinions as thoroughly as time and the preservation of friendly relations at the court allow.
Also, the author of an opinion should be receptive to his colleagues' suggestions.
4. A judge should be open-minded in that he should withhold his final decision until
he is fully informed and should weigh carefully arguments presented to support the opposing
sides.
5. Appeals should be decided quickly, and judges should save time whenever possible
without lessening the quality of their work. Judges' time is in short supply at many courts
because of increased case loads and administrative duties.
6. Judges should get as much help as they can from counsel, both to save time and
to improve their decisions and opinions. Judges believe that the quality of much appellate
advocacy is low, and the trend now is to rely less on counsel and more on staff research.
But, at the least, judges should use counsel as much as they can if only to check the work

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol37/iss2/2
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The constitutional scheme mandates recognition of federalism and separation
of powers when contemplating an ideal federal appellate system function. Federalism produces two opposing effects. On the one hand, federal appellate jurisdiction accomplishes uniformity, while centralizing judicial power and
facilitating hierarchical control.3 2 On the other hand, it fosters diversity. Inferior
federal courts in this country3 3 are unique among federal systems. Article III
judges are the most significant national officials systematically located around
the country. Consequently, national policies are diffused and, in turn, influenced
34
by local political and social concerns.
Separation of powers doctrine legitimates the theory and exercise of judicial
review by these appellate tribunals. Both of the lower federal courts serve with
the Supreme Court as guardians of individual rights against legislative and
executive excess. Independent judicial review traditionally has been central to
the protection of individual rights.3 5 Toward this end, article III judges have
been small in number, highly qualified, and free from popular control.36 Thus
constitutional values of federalism and separated powers provide the larger context for identifying the ideal role and function of the federal intermediate court.
Articulating these concepts of ideal and role only begins the inquiry. The
question of whether these norms have ever been achieved or if they are achievable, is left to others. This article will discuss the current state of the federal
appellate judiciary to identify the threat to these essential qualities and the
coping strategies already in place and proposed. In the process, the article
explores whether the courts of appeals are moving toward or away from the
political system's aspirations for them. A social demand does exist for a high
quality federal judicial institution: The issue, in economic terms, becomes whether
a decline will occur in appellate quality as the move from an elite to a mass
distribution of federal judicial services continues.3 7 The best tradition of appellate

done at the court.

These goals are obviously very interrelated, and the categorization must be somewhat
arbitrary. But they do provide a background for comparing present procedures with the
procedures suggested here. In doing so, I shall try to present a balanced picture, explaining
the major problems behind the suggestions along with their benefits.
The purposive orientation of the judges themselves include: adjudicator, ritualist, administrator,
lawmaker, and educator. J. HOWARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 125-57 (1981).
See also Carrington, supra note 24, at 550-54.
32. Shapiro, Islam and Appeal, 68 CALIF. L.

REv.

350, 350 (1980).

33.

"Inferior" is, of course, the Constitution's term, and is not to be taken qualitatively.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, 5 1.
34. R. RICHARDSON & K. VINES, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL COURTS 173-74 (1970).
35. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally Baker & Baldwin,
Eighth Amendment Challenges to the Length of Criminal Sentences: Following the Supreme Court "From Precedent
to Precedent", 27 ARIz. L. REv. 25, 54 (1985).
36. Higginbotham, Bureaucracy - The Carcinoma of the FederalJudiciary, 31 ALA. L. REv. 261,
263 (1980).
37. Posner, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Survive Until 1984? An Essay on Delegation and
Specialization of the Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 761, 764 (1983). One distinguished com-

mentator described the problem as "near runaway inflation" in the number of cases and personnel.
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advocacy and decision affords the parties a thorough and uninhibited presentation, and assures the judges a deliberative and collegial performance. The
ultimate question is whether this generation of judges is presiding over the
38
demise of the appellate tradition.
III.

PROBLEMS IMAGINED AND REAL

The question of whether the courts of appeals are so overburdened that they
have compromised appellate traditions is one that cannot be answered with
equanimity. Perhaps this and related questions about case load problems cannot
be answered at all; perhaps only opinions and attitudes can be offered. Through
use of three techniques - statistics, testimonials and studies - at least, a
deeper understanding of the problems can be achieved.
A.

Statistics

Statistics should not be used the way a drunken man uses a lamp post for support rather than for illumination. Too often, too much is made of numbers. Indeed, federal court fans are like baseball fans; discussing statistics has
become de riguerur. But the casual fan probably dismisses (the true fan would
say "overlooks") the numbers as some of the finer points of the game. 3 9 Still,
statistics have an important role to play. After all, the very origin of the courts
of appeals depended on a concern for the volume of appeals in the federal
system at the turn of the century. °
Many jurists and commentators have relied on statistics to conclude that
the courts of appeals today labor under such a staggering workload that the
appellate ideal has been lost. 4' Present filings are compared with historical figures
for bold impact. If the 1960's were a time of "exploding dockets, ' 42 then the
last twenty years have experienced a docket chain reaction. For example, former

Meador, The Federal Judiciary - InJlation, Malfunction, and Proposed Course of Action, 1981 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 617, 617-18.
38. See Carrington, Ceremony and Realism: Demise of Appellate Procedure, 66 A.B.A. J. 860 (1980)
(suggesting legal realism is to blame).
39. "A study of the extent of the work of any court is somewhat intriguing - to the judges
[and a few processors]. The members of the Bar may not be altogether bored by it." Evans, A
Work Sheet of Judicial Labor of Appellate Federal Courts, 1943 Wis. L. REv. 313, 313.
40. "Whether a judicial system needs an intermediate set of appellate courts is determined
by the volume of judicial business." 9 J. MOORE, W. TAGOERT & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE I 100.01[1], at 3 (2d ed. 1976).
41.
Perhaps, the more fruitful line of inquiry would be to assess the causes and consequences
of selection of litigation for dispute resolution. Such an approach is beyond the scope of this article.
See generally P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 4-7; Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What
We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society,
31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 4 (1983); Marcus, Judicial Overload: The Reasons and the Remedies, 28 BUFFALO
L. Rav. 111 (1979); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation,
31 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 72 (1983).
42. Brown, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, in Proceedings of the Annual Judicial
Conference Tenth Judicial Circuit of the United States, 44 F.R.D. 245, 338 (1968).
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Solicitor General McCree observed that in the year 1980 more appeals were
filed in the Fifth Circuit alone than were filed in all the courts of appeals in
1940. 43 For a second example, consider the analysis of Judge Posner, United

States Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit:
In the year that ended on June 30, 1981, the number of appeals
filed in the federal courts of appeals increased by 13.6 percent over the
number filed in the previous fiscal year. It is now 58.3 percent higher
than it was as recently as 1975, and more than 400 percent higher than
it was in 1960."
As spectacular as these comparisons are, they may underestimate the effect
of docket growth. Three other considerations illuminate the comparisons: The
judge ratio, weighting cases, and the backlog. Consider the judge ratio. The
number of judges has increased, as has the number of appeals, but the ratio
has steadily declined. 45 In 1940 each circuit judge was personally responsible
for about sixty decisions. By 1980 the number had grown to 175." But even
those numbers understate the workload of a judge who must sit in three judge
panels, which in addition to opinion writing require a judge to prepare for and
participate in the collegiate decision. The following progression illustrates the
47
point:
Year

Appeals

1940
1950
1960
1970
1980

3,446
2,830
3,899
11,662
23,200

Per 3-Tudge Panel
184
131
172
361
527

Within this decade, the pace has continued. In 1984 for the first time, the
number of appeals filed and terminated in the twelve courts of appeals in one
year exceeded 30,000-more than 700 per 3-judge panel. 48

43.

McCree, BureaucraticJustice: An Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 777, 781 (1981).

44. Posner, supra note 37, at 761-62.
45. "[T]he number of courts of appeals judges has increased 94% since 1960, but the number
of filings in the courts of appeals has multiplied more than nine times in the same period." C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3506, at 25-26 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT]. The ratio change is dramatic computed from either side: "Between
1961 and 1983, the number of appeals commenced in the United States Courts of Appeals increased
by 705 percent. The number of authorized judgeships, however, increased by only one hundred
percent." Martineau, Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain Federal Response, 1984 DUKE L.J. 845, 845.

46. McCree, supra note 43, at 781.
47. The figures are taken from Rubin, Bureaucratizationof the Federal Courts: The Tension Between
Justice and Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 648, 649 n.3 (1980) (citations omitted) and ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, table
2, at 97 (1983).
48.
COURTS

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

106 (1984) [hereinafter cited as

ANNUAL REPORT].
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The increased complexity of individual cases is a second aspect of caseload
growth that is difficult to quantify, but which seems intuitively demonstrable.
Comparing the number of filings and terminations provides a shallow measure
of workload. More empirical work must be done.4 9 Some general agreement
exists that in the last two decades there have been more "large" cases on
appeal in terms of parties, issues, difficulty and significance.-" Judge Nelson,
has estimated that such cases
United States Circuit Judge of the Ninth Circuit,
5
have grown at twice the rate of other cases.
A third concern is growth in the backlog. Once again, commentators and
judges have relied on statistics to achieve a startling effect.5 2 The numbers are
difficult to comprehend. Because such a large number of appeals have been
filed nationally, the pending caseload is always large. A more sophisticated sense
of the problem may be gleaned from a breakdown of pending appeals by length
53
of time. As of June 30, 1983, these numbers were as follows:

Total

to 3
Months

4 to 6
Months

7 to 9
Months

10 to 12
Months

More than
12 Months

22,480

7,046

5,064

3,352

2,370

4,648

1

Thus, 20.7 percent of the appeals pending
a year. 54 Certain courts of appeals are in
example, the Ninth Circuit's backlog, one
cases in 1950, to 400 in 1960, to 500 in

have been on the docket more than
more serious crisis than others. For
of the largest, has grown from 250
1970, to its present 5,000.5'

49. See generally H. LAWSON & B. GLITNE, WORKLOAD MEASURES IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
(1980); W. McLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS (1984); THE CASES OF THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

50.

(1982).

McCree, supra note 43, at 781-82. See generally UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS WORK-

LOAD STATISTICS FOR THE DECADE OF THE

1970's (Admin. Office of U.S. Courts 1980).

51.
Nelson, Why Are Things Being Done This Way?, JUDGES J., Fall, 1980, at 13, 14. But see
Sarat, The Role of Courts and the Logic of Court Reform: Notes on the Justice Department's Approach to
Improving Justice, 64 JUDICATURE 300 (1981).
52. See, e.g., Haworth, supra note 10, at 258-59; Lay, A Proposal for Discretionary Review in
Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 Sw. L.J. 1151, 1151-52 (1981).
53. ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 48, table 7, at 107.
54. Id. Cases under submission, as of September 30, 1983, tell a similar but less dramatic
story:
9 to 12
More Than
3 to 6
6 to 9
12 Months
Total
Months
Months
Months
765

444

180

FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS DURING

30, 1983,

83

58

THE TWELVE MONTH PERIOD ENDED SEPTEMBER

U.S. Courts 1983). In 1984 filings and cases pending
REPORT, supra note 48, at 106.
Nelson, supra note 51, at 13 (citations omitted). See also ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NINTH
table 4, at 6 (Admin. Office

increaed over the previous year. ANNUAL

55.
CIRCUIT 9

(1985).
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B.

Testimonials

Statistics do illuminate the problem. Understandably, much attention has
been lavished on available statistics. So much so that one is reminded of the
second drunk, on his hands and knees under the lamp post searching for a
coin dropped some distance away, who explains he is searching where the light
is better. The statistical proof is impressive, but in law such proof, though
usually relevant, is rarely determinative. The statistical conclusion that the problem is real and is really serious is supported additionally by testimonials. Expert
witnesses56 help bring "the cold numbers convincingly to life." 57 Nearly every
article cited in this essay concludes that the workload problem facing the courts
of appeals has created a crisis that jeopardizes their traditional function and
role. 58 Prominent government officials agreeing with this position include: Quentin N. Burdick, United States Senator from North Dakota;5 9 A. Leo Levin,
Director of the Federal Judicial Center; 60 Erwin N. Griswold, former Solicitor
General; 61 Wade H. McCree, former Solicitor General; 62 and William French
63
Smith, former Attorney General.
The judges agree. A majority of circuit judges in the Second, Fifth and
District of Columbia Circuits responded affirmatively to the question, "Do you
feel overloaded and overworked? ' 64 The best evidence that the courts of appeals'65
case load is no longer manageable is the testimony of the judges themselves.
Many prominent circuit judges have agreed publicly: Ruth Bader Ginsburg,

56.

FED.

R. EVID. 702 (defines an expert witness as one "qualified.. .by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, or education").
57.

International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).

58. Contrary commentary can be found, however, although it is decidedly in the minority.
See generally Edwards, supra note 6.
59.

Burdick, Federal Courts of Appeals: Radical Surgery or Conservative Care, 60 Ky. L.J. 807, 807

(1972) ("The Federal Courts of Appeals are afflicted with an illness. While it is not malignant,
there is a potential prognosis of chronic incapacity or partial paralysis.").
60.

Levin, Adding Appellate Capacity to the Federal System: A National Court of Appeals or an Intercircuit
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1, 2 (1982) ("For well over a decade, legal literature has

Tribunal?, 39

reflected a deep concern with the capacity of the federal judicial system to function smoothly and
effectively .... ).
61. Griswold, supra note 10, at 791 ("The problem is a very real one. There can be no
doubt about that. Those who say there is no problem seem to me to be largely unaware of its

ramifications and insensitive to its consequences.").
62.

McCree, supra note 43, at 781 ("Few would dispute that the caseload in the federal

courts has reached crisis proportions.").
63. Smith, The Role of the Federal Courts, 88 CASE & COM. 10, 10 (1983) ("[T]he burdens on
the courts today are actually effecting a change in the character not only of our federal judicial
system, but also of the legal profession and society.").
64. J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 264.
65. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 876 (same observation regarding Supreme Court). Apart

from their expressions of their own overwork, Supreme Court Justices have been sympathetic to
the plight of the intermediate tier. See, e.g., Clark, A Commentary of Congestion in the Federal Courts,
3 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 1 (1976) ("The federal court system now has more work than it can properly

handle."); Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 4-5 ("The [Supreme] Court cannot review a sufficiently
significant portion of the decisions of any federal court of appeals.").
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District of Columbia Circuit; 66 Clement F. Haynsworth, Fourth Circuit;67 James
C. Hill, Eleventh Circuit; 68 Donald P. Lay, Eighth Circuit; 69 Abner J. Mikva,
District of Columbia Circuit;7 ° Dorothy W. Nelson, Ninth Circuit;7 Richard
A. Posner, Seventh Circuit;7 2 and Alvin B. Rubin, Fifth Circuit. 73 Academics
74
long and loud have sung the chorus.
That the crisis likely will continue and probably worsen is a central article
of the federal court faith. Admittedly, good predictions cannot be made because
an adequate theory of caseload growth does not exist. 7- One spectacular prediction is that by the twenty-first century 5,000 courts of appeals judges will
fill 1,000 volumes in the federal reporter disposing of more than 1,000,000
appeals - each year!'6 Whatever the future will bring, this article has carried
the burden of proof that the federal courts of appeals are in big trouble.
C.

Studies

The system has not yet reached a gridlock. But reformers should not be so
irresponsible as to await a complete breakdown. Assuming that the state of the
dockets of the courts of appeals is now or soon will be intolerable, consideration
of reforms is immediately appropriate. Appellate reforms may be grouped along

Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and Workload of Federal Judges, 55

66.

U. CoLo. L. REV. 1, 7 (1983) ("[F]ederal courts today labor under staggering workloads.").
67.
NELL

L.

Haynsworth, Improving the Handling of Criminal Cases in the Federal Appellate System, 59 CORREV.

68.

597, 597 (1974) ("Our federal courts of appeals are in critical condition.").

Hill & Baker, Dam Federal Jurisdiction!, 32 EMORY L.J. 3, 87 (1983) ("In whole, the flood

of litigation is not averted. What is needed, to preserve the analogy, is the design and construction
of a dam equal to the flood.").
69. Lay, supra note 52, at 1151 ("[C]ourts of appeals are so inundated by the volume of
appeals of right [they] can no longer be given the full deliberative process to which they are
entitled.").
70. Mikva, More Judgeships - But Not All at Once, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 23, 23 (1982)
("Everyone knows by now that the caseload in the federal courts is too high.").
71.
Nelson, supra note 51, at 13 ("The problem is not just the number of cases but also the
vast increase in their intricacy.").
72. Posner, supra note 37, at 761 ("[T]he dismal subject of this paper... is the growing
workload of the federal courts of appeals.").
73.
Rubin, supra note 47, at 649 ("Appellate judges are confronted not only with the same
vast increase in intricacy of cases but, in addition, with a staggering increase in the volume of
their work.").
74. See, e.g., P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 4; Haworth, Circuit Splitting and the "New"
National Court of Appeals: Can the Mouse Roar?, 30 Sw. L.J. 839, 841 (1976); Hellman, supra note
31, at 938; Meador, Appellate Case Management and Decisional Processes, 61 VA. L. REV. 255, 255
(1975); Oberman, Coping With Rising Caseload: A New Model of Appellate Review, 46 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 841, 843 (1980); Schwartz, The Other Things That Courts Do, 28 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 438, 438
(1981); Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TEx. L. REv. 949,
957 (1964).
75. Posner, supra note 37, at 764.
76. Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567, 567 (1975). Seegenerally Daniels,
Ladders and Bushes: The Problem of Caseloads and Studying Court Activities Over Time, 1985 AM. B. FouNo.
RESEARCH

J. 751.
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three goals: (1) increasing the efficiency of the present capacity; (2) increasing
the capacity at a constant efficiency; or (3) reducing the allowable demand on
the system. 77 Since the 1960's several efforts have been made to evaluate efficiency, capacity, and demand. A brief overview of those efforts provides further
context and identifies the origin of many of the proposals to be discussed. 7
American Law Institute. The first modem study of federal jurisdiction was the
idea of Chief Justice Warren. In a 1959 speech to the American Law Institute,
Warren challenged, "[i]t is essential that we achieve a proper jurisdictional
balance between the Federal and State court systems assigning to each system
those cases most appropriate in light of basic principles of federalism." 79 The
ALI Study begun in 1960 was completed in 1968 and published under the title
Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts. 0 This farreaching effort focused primarily on the district courts and their major heads
of jurisdiction. Taking the Chief Justice's theme, the Study sought to redraw
the federal/state judicial relation "in a rational and contemporarily useful way." '
The proposals did not anticipate the burgeoning federal dockets, and the Study
has little to offer this discussion, except for the demand-reduction proposition
that a narrowing of federal jurisdiction will decrease the case load demand on
appellate resources.82 Nothing significant came of the Study,83 and it may be
dismissed today as academic.+
American Bar Foundation. The American Bar Foundation commissioned the
first study of the burgeoning appellate caseload.8 Published in 1968, the report,
entitled Accommodating the Workload of the United States Courts of Appeals,86 rec-

77. Carrington, supra note 24, at 555.
78. This summary relies substantially on Meador, supra note 37, at 625-37. See generaly C.
WRIGHT, supra note 45, S 3510, at- 43-49.
79. Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren to the 36th Annual Meeting of the American Law
Institute (May 20, 1959), reprinted in A.L.L PROCEEDINGs 27, 33 (1959).
80.
COURTS

AMERICAN LAW INST.

STUDY OF THE Drvssror OF JURsSDxcrTror BETWEE" STATE AND FEDERAL

(Official Draft 1968).

In the meantime, the Judicial Conference had appointed an ad hoc committee in 1964 to study the
geographical organization of the federal courts which issued a report recommending adding circuit
judges and splitting circuits. See generally Baker, supra note 7, at 696-97.
81. Meador, supra note 37, at 625.
82. But see Wright, supra note 74. Professor Wright appreciated the problem with characteristic
foresight.
83. The proposal was introduced into Congress in 1971 by Senator Burdick and never went
beyond committee. See generally S. 1876, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Federal Court Juridiction Act
of 1971: Continuation of Hearings on S. 1876, Before the Subcomm. of Improvements in JudicialMachinery
of the SenateJudiciay Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); FederalCourt JurisdictionAct of 197t: Hearingr

on S. 1876 Bfore the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Judiciar Comm., 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
84. Cf. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIw, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM xvii (2d ed. 1973) (references to the study); C. WRIGHT,
THE LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS xv

(4th ed. 1983) (repeated references to the study).

85.

Burdick, supra note 59, at 813-15.

86.

AMERICAN

B.

FOUND.,

ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD or THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF

APPEALS (1968).
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ommended some intramural reforms to improve efficiency, recommended an
increase in capacity and, most importantly, proposed a sequential strategy for
dealing with federal appellate growth over the long run:
1. Once a circuit reaches nine judges, the desirability of adding more
judges must be compared to the most direct alternative, that of splitting
a circuit to create a new circuit. On balance, it is more desirable to
add judges than it is to split circuits.

2. When the number of judges in a given circuit exceeds 15, a
"division" system should be adopted whereby judges would be assigned
on a rotating basis to 5 or 7 judge-divisions, with each division having
responsibility for specific substantive subject matter. Up to 30 judges
could be accommodated within a given circuit under this "substantive
divisions" concept.

3. Eventually some circuits will have to split when the caseload
exceeds the capacity of the maximum number of judges who can be
efficiently employed under a "substantive divisions" organization.

4. Contemporaneously in this evolutionary process there will be the
need to furnish assistance to the Supreme Court in its function of guiding
and harmonizing the federal law decided by the Courts of Appeals. Such
assistance could be furnished alternatively by regional appellate panels
of the Courts of Appeals, by appellate panels with jurisdiction over spe'
cific matter, or by a "national circuit." 87
Much of this sequential scenario has come to pass and, as will become apparent,
the rest remains viable.
The Freund Committee. The Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme
Court was published in 1972."8 Commissioned by the Federal Judicial Center,
the Study Group of jurists, scholars, and attorneys came to be known by the
name of its chair, Professor Paul Freund. As its title suggests, the study focused
on the problems of the Supreme Court. 9 The Freund Committee recommended
several efficiency measures, such as the elimination of both the three-judge
district courts and the Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction. However, a

87. Burdick, supra note 59, at 814. See generally Carrington, supra note 24 (Professor Carrington
was the Project Director).
88. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE
SUPREME COURT, reprinted at 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER].
89. The Judicial Center was created in 1968 to "research and study... the operation of the
courts of the United States." Act of Dec. 20, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-219, § 620, 81 Stat. 664,
734. Chief Justice Burger, as Chairman of the Board, appointed the Group to "study the caseload
of the Supreme Court and to make such recommendations as its findings warranted." FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, supra note 88, at ix.
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hailstorm of controversy resulted from a capacity-reform suggesting the creation
of a national court of appeals. 90 Briefly summarized, the proposed court would
be staffed by seven circuit judges sitting for staggered three year terms. The
court would screen all certiorari petitions and appeals and refer about 500 to
the Supreme Court for the Court's selection of the 150-200 for full decision.
Additionally, the court would retain and decide genuine conflicts among the
circuits. Criticism centered on two themes: a concern for the dilution of Supreme Court authority and self-determinism, and a desire to preserve direct
access to the Supreme Court. Seen by some as an attack on the Supreme Court
itself, the proposal was "stillborn," to borrow the diagnosis of a midwife of
federal court reform. 91 The episode did focus attention on the federal appellate
court system and its problems, however, and served to establish some important
92
political limits on the dialogue of reform.
The Hruska Commission. Responding to the collective urgings of Chief Justice
Burger, the Chief Judges of all the courts of appeals, the Judicial Conference
of the United States, the Federal Judicial Center, and the American Bar Association, Congress created the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System in 1972.93 Chaired by Senator Hruska, the Commission included foursomes from the Senate, the House, the Chief Justice's appointments,
and the President's appointments. The legislative charge was broad, but nonjurisdictional: study the federal judicial system's geographical divisions, structure, and internal procedures, and recommend changes "most appropriate for
94
the expeditious and effective disposition of judicial business.
Iii 1973 the Commission issued its first report recommending the division
of the Fifth and Ninth Circuits. 95 This report was largely an efficiency reform.
Two years later, the Commission issued its second report, which considered
structure and internal procedures of the federal appellate courts. 96 Again, the
9 7
capacity-reform of the creation of a national court of appeals was suggested.
To be inserted between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court, the
proposed court would be staffed permanently with seven article III judges. It

90. The commentary was hot and heavy. For a partial bibliography, see Domecus, Congressional
Prerogatives, The Constitution and a National Court of Appeals, 5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 715, 716 n.7
(1978); Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Interdrcuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a
Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 913, 914 n.9 (1983). See also C. WRIGHT, supra note 45, § 3510, at
46 n.9; Meador, supra note 37, at 627 n.59.
91. Meador, supra note 37, at 627.
92. Id.
93. Act of October 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807. See generally CONF. REP.
No. 1457, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 3611; S. REP.
No. 930, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3602, 3605-

06.
94. Act of October 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807.
95. Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The GeographicalBoundaries
of the Several Judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973).

96.

Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal

Procedures: Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975).
97 Id. at 237-47.
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would not perform any screening duties, but would decide cases on the reference
of the Supreme Court and by transfer from the existing appellate courts. It
would be subject to review in the Supreme Court on certiorari. Aside from the
split of the Fifth Circuit, 9 the Hruska Commission proposals did not fare well
in the legislative halls. 99 They did garner much attention within the ivy-covered
walls, both favorable and unfavorable. 10 0
Advisory Council on Appellate Justice. This poorly publicized Council was a
nongovernmental body created in 1971 as a liaison to the Federal Judicial Center
and the National Center for State Courts."0 ' After a four-year study, this council
of judges, lawyers, and law professors developed guidelines for restructuring the
federal appellate system much in line with the Hruska Commission, which
0 2
overshadowed the Council.°
American Bar Association. The A.B.A. generally supported the Hruska Commission.' 0 3 In 1978 the A.B.A. created the Action Commission to Reduce Court
Costs and Delay, which developed a package of appellate reforms to expedite
the disposition of appeals. 10 4 Its intramural proposals are concerned exclusively
with appeal processing efficiency.' 05
The Department of Justice. Appointed by then Attorney General Levi, a committee within the Department of Justice, chaired by then Solicitor General Bork,
surveyed the problems of the federal courts and issued a report in 1977."° The
Report emphasized the problems of the federal system and made several recommendations: The abolition of diversity jurisdiction; the creation of administrative courts under article I for adjudication and appeals under most federal
regulatory laws; the elimination of the Supreme Court's obligatory jurisdiction;
and the creation of a permanent interbranch "Council on Federal Courts" to
plan and coordinate judicial reforms. Because of the change in administrations,
however, the proposals failed to gain momentum. °7 In 1977 Attorney General
Bell established a new unit within the Department called the Office for Im-

98. See generally Baker, supra note 7.
99. The proposals were introduced, but never considered. S. 2763, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975); S. 2762, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); H.R. 11,219, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. (1975); H.R.
11,218, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See generally Meador, supra note 37, at 628.
100. See, e.g., Domecus, supra note 90 (favorable); Haworth & Meador, A Proposed New Federal
Intermediate Appellate Court, U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201 (1978) (favorable); Hruska, The Commission on
Revision of the Federal Court Appellate S)stem: A Legislative History, 1974 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 579 (favorable);
Swygert, The Proposed National Court of Appeals: A Threat to Judicial Symmetry, 51 IND. L.J. 327 (1976)
(unfavorable).
101.
Meador, supra note 37, at 628-29.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 629.
104. Hufstedler & Nejelski, ABA Action Commission Challenges Litigation Cost and Delay, 66 A.B.A.
J. 965 (1980).
105. See generally Weisberger, Appellate Courts: The Challenge of Inundation, 31 AM. U.L. REv.
237 (1982).
106. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE COMM. ON REvISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM, THE NEEDS
OF THE FEDERAL COURTS

107.

(1977).

Meador, supra note 37, at 630-31.
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provements in the Administration of Justice. 0 8 The Office was designed to
develop and promote court reforms. It achieved a fair degree of legislative
9
success.1
These various studies have been complemented by congressional attention,110
judicial self-improvement,"' and the insights of dozens of commentators on the
federal judicial scene." 2 The conclusion seems inescapable that the federal judiciary is under serious stress at the appellate level. These studies confirm that
some extramural structural reform is necessary. A better confirmation, however,
may be found in the courts' own reactions to the stress and the effect this has
had on the ideal system function and process imperative.
IV.

INTRAMURAL REFORM

As summarized above, the federal appellate system has been under pressure
for some time now. Like a living organism, the system has adapted to those
stresses. Without such adaptations, the system would not have survived. The
evolution, however, has seriously compromised the ideal and function of the
system. Furthermore, judicial reforms, labeled here as "intramural reforms,"
appear to be nearly complete.
Intramural reforms are measures that adapt the procedures for performing
the accepted appellate role and function described for the federal system. They
amount to shortcuts, to an abbreviated process justified by the press of docket.
For convenience, intramural reforms have been grouped by appellate function:
oral argument, briefing, opinion writing, case management, support staff, and miscellaneous proposals.
A.

Oral Argument

The external stress of caseload has changed oral argument practices dramatically. The theory for this change was ably stated in a syllogism by Chief
Judge Godbold of the Eleventh Circuit." 3 First, appellate cases are not fungible,
and courts can articulate and apply differentiating standards and procedures.
Second, judicial resources are finite, and caseload demand outstrips supply and
will continue to do so. Thus, the logic goes, an appellate court should be granted
4
the discretion to choose not to hear oral arguments in some appeals."
As amended in 1979, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34 provides for
oral argument "in all cases" unless, under a local rule, a three-judge panel

108.
109.

See 42 Fed. Reg. 8140 (1977).
See, e.g., The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (amending

28 U.S.C. S 631-636, 604(d)(3) & 1915 (1976)); 18 U.S.C. 5 3401 (1976); Federal Courts Improvement
Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
110. See Meador, supra note 37, at 634-36.
111. See id. at 637.
112. See id. at 629-30 nn.69-81 (citations).
113. See generally Godbold, Improvements in Appellate Procedure. Better Use of Available Facilities, 66
A.B.A. J. 863 (1980).
114. Id. at 864.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1985

19

Florida Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVII

unanimously agrees it is not needed. 1 5 The local rule must articulate a standard
that establishes oral argument as the norm. Three situations justify an exception
to the norm: "(1) the appeal is frivolous; (2) the dispositive issue or set of
issues has been recently authoritatively decided; or (3) the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the briefs and record and the decisional
process would not be significantly aided by oral argument.' 6 This Rule is an
improvement over some preexisting local rules that provided a power to deny
oral argument whenever the "case is of such character as not to justify oral
argument."" ' 7 Such a standardless approach permitted a panel, a judge, or even
a law clerk to deny oral argument by intuition." 8
Perhaps because denial of oral argument is against the American appellate
tradition, local practices typically limit the power further. Present Eleventh Circuit Local Rule 23 is fairly typical."19 Under this Rule, a screening panel (three
judges assigned together for a year) must unanimously classify a case for the
nonargument calendar. At any time prior to decision any of the three judges
can reclassify for the oral argument calendar, without explanation. Additionally,
the decision on the merits must be unanimous and without special concurring
or dissenting opinions unless all the parties agree to nonargument.
Nationwide, between forty and fifty percent of the appeals decided by the
2
courts of appeals in recent years have been decided without oral argument. '
The savings in judicial resources and private litigants' resources are supposedly
apparent. Chief Judge Godbold concludes:
In a simple case in which the result is clear and no close or significant
issues of law are involved, transporting counsel to the place of holding
court and paying them for attendance is a waste of societal assets in a
world where there are other priorities. . . .Perhaps most important of all,
the appellate court's function and value are demeaned by requiring it
2
to carry out acts merely ceremonial, while pretending the facade is real.' '
Arguably, in many instances the cases involving settled principles may get even
closer attention in determining whether they can be discarded summarily. Each
judge will consider the issue in chambers through use of a draft opinion rather
than by a cursory discussion after a truncated argument.

115. FED. R. App. P. 34(a). The amendment codified the prevailing practice among the courts
of appeals. The Fifth Circuit had begun experimenting with a nonargument summary calendar in
the late 1960's as one means of coping with the burgeoning caseload. See generally Haworth, supra
note 74, at 865-67; Haworth, supra note 10, at 265-69.
116. FED. R. App. P. 34(a).
117. Haworth, supra note 74, at 866.
118. Id.
119. See 11TH CIR. R. 23. See generally G. RAHDERT & L. ROTH, APPEALS TO THE FrH CIRCUIT
MANUAL ch. 14, at 3-5 (1977); Godbold, supra note 113.
120. The percentage hovers above 40 percent. See ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 48, at 114. See
also Edwards, supra note 6, at 894.
121.
See Godbold, supra note 113, at 865.
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Even such an enlightened procedure must, however, generate some policy objections. 22 Oral argument is not necessary in all cases, but it should
be permitted in more than half of the cases. Several reasons support this position. First, the court time saved by eliminating oral argument is relatively
small. The amount of time an appellate judge spends preparing for and conducting oral argument is not great, even when multiplied by three to account
for the panel. Indeed, the missed opportunity to test and confirm a theory of
the case may result in a longer decision time. 123 Second, the government should
be reluctant to step in to save private resources. The invisible hand of the
market is more trustworthy than a robed planner. Nonargument could remain
a private option when the appellant makes the choice or the parties agree. That
would be a market allocation. But the real cost of the lost oral argument is in
terms of legitimating the judicial function, establishing communication between
bench and bar and allowing judges the opportunity to ask questions and thoughtfully focus pn the major issues. 24 The real value of oral argument lies in the
legitimating function of allowing the litigants to address the decisionmaker faceto-face. Wholesale denial of oral argument represents a greater threat to the
25
progress toward the appellate ideal.
Both the dilemma and its resolution are unattractive. In many cases, a
practice of considerable importance to the appellate function has been eliminated, at least in part, to preserve its use in other cases in which it is deemed
more useful. 26 In the process, the federal court system has moved farther away
from the ideal. Oral argument should not be an absolute right, but the denial
rate has outgrown the justification for denial. Not surprisingly, an inverse proportion has arisen between the reversal rate and the growth in the nonargument
calendar. 27 Furthermore, when Congress has added judges in the past, the
nonargument calendar has remained constant. One possible explanation is that,
under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a), almost half of the federal
appeals are "(1) frivolous" or "(2) unauthoritative." A more likely explanation,
however, is that the catch-all "(3) adequate briefing and insignificant for oral
argument" is being used to establish a docket median below which expediency
permits below average process. This suggestion is troubling. The experience of
the Second Circuit, which alone among the courts of appeals provides oral
argument as a matter of course despite a large docket, is a final example that

122. Courts have steadfastly rejected constitutional due process challenges to the practice. See,
e.g., George W.B. Bryson & Co. v. Norton Lilly & Co., 502 F.2d 1045, 1048-51 (5th Cir. 1974);
Huth v. Southern Pac. Co., 417 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir. 1969); Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis,
406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1969).
123. Carrington, supra note 24, at 558.
124. See generally Washy, The Functions and Importance of Appellate Oral Argument: Some Views of
Lawyers and Federal Judges, 65 JUDICATURE 340, 344-48 (1982).
125.

See supra notes 13-38 and accompanying text. See also P.

126.

Washy, supra note 124, at 342, 353.

CARRINOTON,

supra note 14, at

25.
127. See Haworth, supra note 74, at 867.
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the other federal courts of appeals have been too hasty in eliminating oral
28
arguments.
B.

Briefs

The federal appellate courts have thus reduced oral argument dramatically
in an effort to cope with increased filings. In making that choice, the courts
have necessarily emphasized the importance of written presentation. Written
briefs have several inherent advantages. 29 Written submissions have an "absorption advantage" over the oral presentation, which is said and gone. 3 ° In
a process with a written opinion as an end product, the briefs serve as raw
material. Briefs also are portable and convenient. Moreover, a common attitude
exists among lawyers and judges that the brief is generally better prepared than
3
the oral argument.' '
Some experts would deemphasize briefs, however, because they feel that oral
argument is more conducive to process imperatives. 3 2 The idea of completely
dispensing with briefs goes a bit too far, although that is the English tradition
and was the early American experience. 33 More realistically, the idea of an
oral calendar would allow for short written submissions - true "briefs." The
34
Ninth Circuit has experimented with such a program on a voluntary basis.
With this approach, written submissions are very short and filing time is greatly
reduced. The oral argument session becomes the arena for presentation, advocacy, and decision.' 35 While this approach seems feasible, experience is limited. This is due largely to the implicit rejection of a briefing deemphasis in
the more common nonargument calendar which chooses to deemphasize orality.
1 36
Perhaps not enough has been done to test this implicit choice.
C.

Opinions

Other ways of dealing with delay and backlog include reducing the length
of opinions, even eliminating some opinions altogether, and selectively pub-

128. SeeJ. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 23-27. Reliance is qualified by the admission that more
than three-fourths of the docket comes from New York City so that only a taxi ride to the courthouse
is involved and oral arguments are five or ten minute exchanges.
129. P. CARRINOTON, supra note 14, at 25-27.
130. While most courts record oral arguments, one may question whether the judges replay
the tapes or whether the practice is designed chiefly to aid the absent law clerk in later drafting
an opinion. The tapes become significant, if at all, on the issue of concessions or stipulations. See
5TH CIR. R. 34.7 (tape recordings are for the exclusive use of court).
131.
See Wasby, supra note 124, at 348-53.
132. P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 26.
133. Id. at 27-28.
134. For a description, see Chapper, Fast, Faster, Fastest; Appellate Courts Develop Special Tracks
to Fight Delay, JUDGES' J., Spring 1981, at 50, 56. See also J. CECIL, ADMINISTRATIO OF JUSTICE
IN A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT

46-79 (1985).

135. See Chapper & Hanson, Expedited Procedures for Appellate Courts: Evidence from California's
Third District Court of Appeal, 42 Mr.. L. REV. 696, 697-98 (1983).
136. See infra text accompanying notes 272-74.
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lishing opinions. a3 The approaches are related because the unpublished opinion
frequently is shorter than the published variety. How this appellate function is
performed is decidedly important in the allocation of judicial resources because
3 8
This reality
nearly one-half of a judge's time involves opinion preparation.
process.
writing
opinion
to
the
attracts reformers
Although the art of good opinion writing should be encouraged, not every
record on appeal presents a canvas deserving of a masterpiece.' 3 9 Too much
of the appellate process is lost, however, unless the artist is obligated to apply
at least a few brushstrokes beyond the signature. The very integrity of the
appellate process requires that courts state their reasons.1" The appellate ideal
and system function described earlier make explicit this basic assumption of the
common law tradition of deciding appeals.' 4' Quantity/quality tradeoffs are frequently argued and, properly, have been pursued, because opinion writing is
the most labor intensive feature of the appellate process.
An opinion serves three critical purposes. 14 2 First, litigants and the public
are assured the decision is the product of reasoned judgment and thoughtful
evaluation rather than the mere exercise of whim and caprice. Second, the very
writing of an opinion reinforces the decisionmaking and ensures correctness.
Third, appellate opinions are the lifestream of the common law, for they create
precedents.
The first purpose may be partly served without an opinion in every appeal.
Granted, there would be sufficient writing to assure the general public that the
courts are not acting altogether arbitrarily or casually. 1 3 But neither the general
public nor the particular litigants would have that assurance in the given opinionless decision. Litigants seem especially deserving of an explanation.'" Of
course, arbitrariness can always be covered by an opinion, but that much cynicism obliges a belief in affirmative deceit not just arbitrariness, and a writing
requirement does confine arbitrariness.
The second purpose for requiring a written statement in all cases is to ensure
an important discipline for decision. A decisionmaker who must reason through

Much has been written on the subject. For a selective bibliography, see generally C.
A SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SURVEY 17-21 (1978).
138. See Haworth, supra note 74, at 867-68.
137.

BOLDEN, APPELLATE OPINION PREPARATION -

139. See Younger, On Judicial Opinions Considered as One of the Five Arts: The Coen Lecture, 51 U.
COLO. L. REv. 341 (1980). But see Vining, Justice Bureaucracy and Legal Writing, 80 MICH. L. REv.

248 (1981).
supra note 14, at 31. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 1.
See supra text accompanying notes 13-38.
See generally Merrill, Could Judges Deliver More Justice if They Wrote Fewer Opinions?, 64
JUDICATURE 435 (1981).
143. Id. at 435.
144. This is not to suggest that litigants have a constitutional right to a written opinion, but
a decision on the record and a statement of reasons is part and parcel of the procedural due
process that courts impose on the other branches, as a general matter of hornbook law. See J.
NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTTrrUTIONAL LAW 555-56 (2d ed. 1984); Friendly, "Some
Kind of a Hearing", 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1267, 1279-95 (1975). See also infra note 149.
140.
141.
142.

P. CARRINGTON,
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to a conclusion in print has reasoned in fact. Misconceptions and oversights of
fact and law are discoverable in the process of writing. Everyone familiar with
the appellate process has heard and used the expression, "It will not write that
way" to mean that a tentative vote will not withstand the careful discipline of
record reading, legal research, and opinion drafting. Yet, without a writing
requirement some tentative votes would escape such scrutiny. Abstractly, opinion writing prolongs the process and, on occasion, a correct decision that has
been unduly delayed may be as detrimental as an incorrect decision.14 5 The
answer to this criticism is to expedite the exceptional case for quick hearing
and decision with a brief opinion.' 46 In the balance of interests involved, the
value of self-restraint provided by writing deserves greater weight than the value
of efficiency gained through decision by edict. Reasoned decision is possible
without writing, but sufficiently less likely that the writing requirement should be
preserved at almost all costs. More marginal resources should be spent in deciding when to write than in giving each decision its writing due.
The third purpose of writing is most important of all because of the traditional importance of precedent and the doctrine of stare decisis.'47 A deciding
panel participates in a dialogue that is both backward and forward looking,
both inwardly and outwardly directed, and both upwardly and downwardly
important. 48 A decision builds on past decisions and shapes future decisions.
An appellate judgment decides a particular controversy and guides the resolution
of later controversies. The court of appeals supervises the district court and is
supervised, in turn, by the Supreme Court. In all these relationships, the court
of appeals must communicate its reasoning to perform its role. An expression
of reasoning will always contribute to the body of precedent or usefully inform
149
the Supreme Court.
The consensus has been that litigants are entitled, as a matter of policy, to
some statement of reasons for a decision.' 50 The courts of appeals have violated
this consensus by providing for and rendering judgments without any opinion.
A Fifth Circuit innovation, 5 ' the practice is anathema to the appellate function

145.
Merrill, supra note 142, at 435.
146. See, e.g., 4TH CIR. R. 34 5 (expediting appeals). Indeed, on occasion it might be appropriate to announce a decision with an opinion to follow.
147. Baker, supra note 7, at 712.
148. See id. at 712-13, 731-34.
149. Merrill, supra note 142, at 435. The Supreme Court is hampered in the performance of
its role when forced to review an opinionless decision. See Taylor v. McKeithen, 407 U.S. 191,
194 n.4 (1972), vacating 457 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1971). In this regard, the California Supreme
Court's practice of ordering depublication (not printed in the official reports) of particular opinions
of the state intermediate court is extraordinary. See generally Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the
California Supreme Court, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 514 (1984).
150. Haworth, supra note 74, at 868.
151.
See NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Local 990, 430 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1970).
See generally Shuchman & Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can Judges Select Cases
of "No Precedential Value"?, 29 EMOR'e L.J. 195 (1980). The Supreme Court, before and since, has
used the technique to cope with docket volume. See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT
PRACTICE § 428, at 317-21 (5th ed. 1978).
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and role previously described. 5 2 Avowedly never used to finesse or hide
a difficult issue, 5 3 an affirmance without opinion is permissible by local
rule if: (1) the findings of fact are not clearly erroneous; or "(2) the
evidence supporting the jury's verdict is not insufficient; or (3) substantial
evidence on the record as a whole supports an agency's order; and (4)
"the Court also determines that no error of law appears and an opinion
would have no precedential value. .... ",. 5
Initially justified soley as self-defense against the threat of a Fifth Circuit
docket disaster, the number of affirmance-without-opinion dispositions has
decreased over the years, and the judges have begun to use the technique
differently.1 5 In 1977 slightly more than one-half of the nonargument calendar cases and about ten percent of the oral argument calendar cases
were decided without opinion. By 1983 the nonargument calendar use had
fallen to less than three percent and the oral argument calendar use had
remained at seven percent. Judges have apparently receded from their initial
enthusiasm and the technique remains most useful in cases in which oral
argument confirms that no issue is in doubt. In these cases, a notice is
sent to counsel after argument that in effect classifies the appeal as virtually
frivolous.
Nevertheless, the appropriate accommodation of the competing interests
requires some form of written opinion. Insufficient attention has been given
to the abridged opinion, a written opinion primarily addressed to the parties, which identifies the issue on appeal, announces the court's disposition,
and gives the principled basis for the ruling. 5 6 Given the narrow audience,
the facts and procedural history can be omitted.'5 " Less important and less
complete, these opinions would naturally have less precedential impact, but
not by the artifice of declaring "nonprecedential precedents. "158 Standards
for nonargument calendar selection and for affirmance without opinion disposition have alreadly been articulated. Strangely, similar criteria and a
uniform practice concerning the simple, traditional per curiam opinion are
not available. Such a device would provide a "useful economy" in the
majority of federal appeals. 5 9 Criticisms of long opinion writing come not
just from the ivory tower, but from the bench as well. For example, Judge
Rubin, United States Circuit Judge for the Fifth Circuit, has recently chal-

152.
153.

See supra text accompanying notes 13-38.
NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, Local 990, 430 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1970).

154.

5TH

CIR. R.

47.6. See FED. R. App. P. 47.

155. Figures cited here are from G. RAHDERT & L. ROTH, supra note 119, ch. 2, at 25 n.92.
156. Wald, supra note 29, at 782.
157. Id. See also P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 33-35.
158. "I think all I am speaking about is.. .a nonprecedential precedent." Hearings Before the
Comm'n on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System 2d Phase 537 (1974-75) (testimony of Judge
Robert Sprecher), quoted in Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent - Limited Publication
and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 1167, 1167 (1978).
159. Carrington, supra note 24, at 559.
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lenged the judges to spend less time worrying about the scholarly nature
of their opinions. 6°
Admittedly, the shorter opinion is not always easier to write, and many a wag has
made the point.' 6 ' The memorandum per curiam should be the standard, with the
scholarly exegisis saved for the truly deserving decision. The time and resources
saved by this shift in emphasis would not be limited to the actual drafting, but would
also extend to future drafting and to efforts to stay abreast of the law.
For expediency, memorandum opinions could even be dictated in open court
with only a little extra preparation in those cases in which oral argument reveals
no issues in doubt. 62 This procedure might not save much time over the memorandum opinion. Yet, the Second Circuit has used the oral per curiam opinion
in a useful way for those cases in which the court is performing only a dispute
resolution function and not a law generation function. However, the Second
Circuit experience is not readily transferable because oral argument is guaranteed in each case and substantial central staff resources are used to settle
appeals and monitor case flow, but not used in the decisional process. 6' Furthermore, this Second Circuit practice reportedly has diminished markedly, and
apparently for good reason. When an oral per curiam is delivered, the other
members of the panel are reluctant to suggest changes, corrections, or additions.
Circulation of a written opinion allows for more give and take. At bottom, the
process of deciding an appeal without an opinion suffers from the fact that no
standard or rule effectively limits the practice to truly frivolous cases. The reality
is that the courts of appeals are silently deciding appeals that twenty years ago
would have been thought to merit a full opinion.' 6 That reality is at odds with
the appellate ideal and the proper concept of role. This is one example where
the courts of appeals have pursued efficiency at too high a price.
Whether to publish the proposed memorandum per curiam opinions and,
if not, whether to allow citation to unpublished opinions are two questions
160. American judicial opinions surpass in verbiage, in length and in citation those written
anywhere else in the world. . . . Occasionally each of us may render a decision, perhaps
in a highly significant case, that demands exposition of the full palette of our talents, but
I fear that much of our time and the time of our clerks is spent merely in seeking felicitous
expression, adding citations and attempting to produce works of art. It would be worthwhile
for judges to experiment with much simpler opinion models. We will succeed, however,
only if we de-institutionalize the demand for scholarly opinions. A good motto for us might
be: Sufficient unto the case is the decision thereof.
Rubin, Management Problems in the Federal Courts: Curbing Bureaucratization and Reducing
Other Tensions Between Justice and Efficiency, quoted in Nelson, supra note 51, at 15 n.7. See also
Gardner, Toward Shorter Opinions, 55 CAL. ST. B.J. 240 (1980); Wald, supra note 29, at 782-83.
161.
"I have made this letter longer than usual because I lack the time to make it shorter."
B. PASCAL, PROVENrIAL LETTERS XVI, quoted in Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 986 n.22 (5th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980).
162. Lumbard, Current Problems of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 29, 37-38

(1968).
163. Oberman, supra note 74, at 851-52. Some court-watchers suggest that the Second Circuit
does use staff resources in the decisional process in certain categories of appeals. Two examples
are habeas and prisoner petition cases. Oral argument is rare in such cases even in the Second
Circuit.
164. Edwards, supra note 6. at 895.
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distinct. These are not new questions, limited to the burdened courts of appeals.
As long as common law courts have decided appeals, debate has persisted
concerning limited publication of opinions. In times of docket growth, however,
the rhetoric becomes more shrill. 65 In perspective, the published opinion is the
centerpiece in' the courts of appeals' performance of role and the function of
precedent. 166 Historically, limited publication has been the rule both in England
and in this country, with control of selection and content in the hands of private
concerns. Today, the West Publishing Company routinely publishes all opinions
provided under the publication policy in each circuit. 167 The modern issue is
whether judges should have control over the selection of opinions for publication
and citation, and, if so, by what standards. 68
Each of the circuits has its own limited publication/no citation plan, all of
which share a common purpose but vary in their particulars. 6 9 Limited publication means just that: The panel decides not to publish some opinions beyond
communication to the litigants. Non-citation is just as literal a component of
the typical plan. Once some opinions go unreported, the next question is whether
the unpublished opinion may be cited to the court or by the court.1 70 The
arguments for and against the policy are telling.' 7' Proponents of a non-citation
rule argue: (1) unpublished opinions are written for the litigants only and would
require substantial refinement to merit wider distribution; (2) if citation were
permitted, a black market in unreported opinions would develop, which would
frustrate part of the reason for nonpublication; (3) access would necessarily be
unequal, as for example, between institutional litigators who could maintain an
opinion bank and private persons; (4) properly unpublished opinions represent
mere applications of settled principles, adding nothing but volume to the precedent stream. Opponents of a non-citation plan argue that citation is necessary
to the rule of stare decisis. Today's practice decidedly follows the proponents'

165. [U]nlimited proliferation of published opinions constitutes a burden and a threat to
a cohesive body of law .... [T]here are limits on the capacity of judges and lawyers to
produce, research and assimilate the sheer mass of judicial opinions. These limits are
dangerously near at present and in some systems may already be exceeded.... Common
law in the United States could be crushed by its own weight if present trends continue
unabated.
Joiner, Limiting Publication of judicial Opinions, 56 JUDICATURE 195, 196 (1972).
166. Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals:
The Pice of Reform, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 573, 575-77 (1981).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 577. Conflict may arise between court and publisher. See United States v. Kilpatrick,
570 F. Supp. 505 (D. Colo. 1983); N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1984, at 1, col. (Justice Dep't obtains
temporary order barring opinion from West Publishing Company's Federal Supplement).
169. See generally Black, Hide and Seek Precedent: Phantom Opinions in Ohio, 50 U. CN. L. REv.
477, 478 n.4 (1981); Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 218-24; Oberman, supra note 74, at 851 n.56 (1980),
Note, Unreported Decisions in the United States Courts of Appeals, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 128 (1977).
170. See generally Walther, The Noncitation Rule and the Concept of Stare Decisis, 61 MARQ. L. REv.
581 (1978).
171. P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 37; Haworth, supra note 74, at 868-70; Note, supra
note 169, at 145-46.
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view that a no-citation rule is part and parcel of a limited publication plan.1 2
If the purpose of the limited publication rule is to lower the costs of producing
and consuming appellate decisions, a no-citation limitation should follow. 7 3 The
more difficult question is whether the nonpublication approach is appropriate.
74
Federal developments concerning nonpublication may be summarized briefly.
In 1964 the Judicial Conference of the United States formally resolved that
publication would be reserved for those opinions having "general precedential
value."1 5 In 1972 the Federal Judicial Center and the Judicial Conference
requested each court of appeals to develop a limited publication/no-citation plan." 6
7
Little has changed since the establishment of each circuit as a laboratory.
The debate over limited publication/no-citation plans centers on three assumptions: (1) full publication is not a necessary element of the appellate
function; (2) the costs of full publication outweigh the benefits; and (3) judges
can and will properly distinguish between the publishable and the not publishable."' 8 An opinion performs double duty, of course. As a mandate, an opinion
adds substantially to the finality of the judicial resolution of the dispute between
the party litigants. As a unit of precedent, an opinion makes law. The argument
goes that some appellate decisions perform only the first and not the second
duty when the appeal calls for the application of well-settled principles. In a
very practical way, the view one takes reflects one or another philosophy of
law. On one level, courts of appeals generate headnotes arranged under Key
Numbers. The decision is then catalogued under the Key Number for some
future invocation. The principle is the thing. On another level, actual applications of earlier established principles demonstrate those principles and describe
their effective content. The application is the thing. How one answers the
question, "Which is the real thing?" decides whether the appellate presumption
is for or against publication; whether in other words, full publication is a
necessary element. "9 Appellate decisionmaking involves more than merely articulating and applying doctrine. Law, and appellate decisionmaking as a pure
form of law, is and always will be more an art than a science. To understand,
one must know how and why the Court's political power is being exercised.
In regard to the second assumption, the advocates of a limited publication/
no-citation plan conclude that costs of full publication are so high that selective
publication is preferable. Admittedly, the resource costs of opinion preparation
are increased marginally for editing for publication, which presumably would

172. Haworth, supra note 74, at 869-70.
173. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 158, at 1186.
174. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 166, at 577-79.
175. 1964 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT 11. Interestingly, the resolution
went on to urge "that opinions authorized to be published be succinct." Id. See supra text accompanying notes 156-64.

176.

1972

JUDICIAL

CONFERENCE OF THE

UNITED STATES REPORT

33.

177. See 1974 JUDICIAL CONFEIENCE OF THE UNITED STATES REPORT 12. See generally Reynolds
& Richman. supra note 166, at 578-79.
178. Reynolds & Richman, suftra note 166, at 579.
179. Id. at 579-80.
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not be done "just" for the litigants. Some pride and all concerns for future
application are eliminated with a non-published, non-citable opinion. These costs
are difficult to quantify, however, and seem somewhat speculative. Furthermore,
"sufficient unto the case" the proposed memorandum opinion device would avoid these costs, if only as a matter of self-restraint.
Concerns for costs to captive readers and purchasers also gain the attention
of nonpublication proponents.""0 Library expenses increase with volume. Readership includes judges and courts who must apply precedents, scholars who
must perform as critics, and advocates who must advise clients and write briefs.
These concerns are not convincing because system collapse is not imminent,
and because unprincipled nonpublication poses a more decided threat to the
appellate ideal. The "flood of opinions" argument has been around for hundreds
of years, yet private sector accommodations and specializations continue to cope.181
Even if all the arguments in favor of nonpublication are accepted, the practice has grave consequences. The appellate ideal contemplates such a central
role for the published opinion that a two-tracked system is a different system.
In a profession that judges itself by the appearance of impropriety, limited
publication appears at odds with accepted appellate tradition. Suspicions and
accusations spring to mind, if not to reality. 82 Stare decisis is twice diminished.
First, the decision itself is freed from the responsibility to reason within full
view. Second, an increment of precedent is rendered unusable. Nonpublication
could allow arbitrary and unreasonable decisions to go unnoticed and unremedied, substituting a rule of men for a rule of law. First impressions might
go unchecked. Judging in such cases might degenerate into an administrativestyle case processing. One of the major means of holding article III judges
accountable would be lost. The parade of possible horrors marches on and on.
Little of substance can be said of the actual experience of the courts of
appeals with the nonpublication rules. Critics and champions alike have fought
with speculations. The commentary has largely been negative, much of it intensely so.'8 3 Professors Reynolds and Richman have attempted an empirical

See Merrill, supra note 142, at 471.
We must not make the loads these captives bear an unbearable one or the system
surely will collapse. It is on the critical appraisal of the scholar that the public must largely

180.

rely for an impersonal and knowledgeable assessment of the work of the courts. It is upon
the discriminating briefing of the lawyers that we ourselves depend. We should strive to
relieve these people from waste of time in reading that which really adds nothing to the

substance of the law.
Id.
181. See generally Jacobstein, Some Reflections on the Control of the Publication of Appellate Cott
Opinions, 27 STAN. L. REv. 791, 795-96 (1975).
The resourcefulness of the specialized bar is not only equal to the task of coping with the opinion
output but seems capable of circumventing the courts' reduction efforts. For example, the May
1982 issue of the Banking Law Journal carried an editorial requesting the readership to send in
unreported opinions for unofficial publication in its pages. Dunne, Editor's Headnotes, 99 BANKING

L.J. 387 (1982).
182.
183.

Reynolds & Richman, supra note 166, at 581.
See, e.g., Gardner, Ninth Circuit's Unpublished Opinions: Denial of Equal Justice?, 61 A.B.A.
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assessment of the various nonpublication plans in the courts of appeals." 4 Expected benefits include swifter justice and increased productivity. The study
found that appeals decided with unpublished opinions were resolved much more
quickly, although Professors Reynolds and Richman found it impossible to determine how much of the time saved was attributable to the nonpublication
designation and how much was the simple result of less judicial effort required
for decision.' 85 While their study found no support for the hypothesis that limited
publication enhances productivity, the researchers were careful to explain that
any conclusion on productivity was impossible because of the number of variables. 186
The study sought to measure two costs of nonpublication: diminished opinion quality and suppression of precedent. The study divided all of opinion
writing into three parts: reasoned opinions, decisions based on the opinion
below, and decisions without discernible justification." 7 At minimum the principal investigators preferred an opinion that identified the appeal and went on
to give reasons for and to declare the ultimate result. Although most of the
unpublished opinions did this, the authors were somewhat critical of the decision
by reference to a trial court opinion. The decision-by-reference was criticized
due to the lack of access by those not parties to the litigation and the appearance
that the decision on appeal was merely a rubber stamp. 88 These criticisms are
not persuasive. Unpublished opinions are not designed to serve a constituency
beyond the actual litigants, and a "reasoned opinion" that parrots the opinion
below does little to dissuade the extreme cynic. The third category, decisions
with no discernible justifications, marks only a difference in opinion typology
between this author and Professors Reynolds and Richman. They criticized the
nonpublication plans for including the previously discussed option to decide an
appeal without an opinion.8 9 Certainly, the ad hoc use of the boilerplate opinion
that recites simply "after due consideration" or "upon a review of the record
and the briefs of the parties" is no better than the formal provisions that allow
for a one word judgment "affirmed.' ' 90 Those are not unpublished opinions,
however, not because they are not published, but because they are not opinions.
The second cost Professors Reynolds and Richman addressed was the opinion
that should have been published but was not; that is, the problem of suppressed
precedent.'
Although they did not discover widespread suppression of prece-

J. 1224 (1975); Hoffman, Nonpublication of Federal Appellate Court Opinions, 6 JusT. Sys. J. 405 (1981);
Stern, The Enigma of Unpublished Opinions, 64 A.B.A. J. 1245 (1978); Comment, A Snake in the Path
of the Law: The Seventh Circuit's Non-Publication Rule, 39 U. Pier. L. REV. 309 (1977).
184. See generally Reynolds & Richman, supra note 166; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 158;
Reynolds & Richman, Limited Publication in the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, 1979 DUKE L.J. 807.
185. See Reynolds & Richman, supra note 166, at 593-95.
186. See id. at 595-97.
187. See id. at 599-604.
188. See id.
189. See supra text accompanying notes 139-64.
190. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 166, at 603-04.
191.
See id. at 606-21.
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dent, the authors found opinions that they were persuaded should have been
published. Examples of such holdings included novel state law questions, defective administration by an agency, inadequacies of national statutes, and district court mistakes.19 Additionally, they suggested that nonpublication was
inappropriate, although actually rare, when judges articulate concurring or dis193
senting opinions or when the judgment was reversed.
On balance, Professors Reynolds and Richman concluded that the suppressed
precedent is a less significant problem than the "shoddy" opinion. 94 Their
ultimate conclusion that any proposed rule must maximize the "benefits of
limited publication while avoiding as many costs as possible ' 1 95 is the correct
one. Their intermediate reasoning, however, is not fully persuasive. Although
a satisfactory method for selecting which opinions to publish may not exist, the
present patchwork system is unsatisfactory. 96 Standards are necessary. Both the
Advisory Council on Appellate Justice' 91 and the American Bar Association

192. Id. at 606-12.
193. See id. at 612-20.
194. See id. at 621. The authors also considered the disparate impact of nonpublication in
certain categories of cases, the relationship between the nonargument calendar and nonpublication,
and the role of the central staff, which taken together suggested that "the courts of appeals often
behave much like courts with discretionary jurisdiction - like certiorari courts - in short." Id.
at 625.
195. Id. at 626.
196. "[T]here is no satisfactory method of selecting which cases are to be published and which
omitted." Jacobstein, supra note 181, at 794. See generally Walther, supra note 170.
197. At the behest of the Federal Judicial Center, a group of lawyers, law teachers, and judges
joined with the National Center for State Courts to form the Council, which promulgated standards
for the publication decision:
I. Standard for Publication
An opinion of the (highest court) or of the (intermediate court) shall not be
designated for publication unless:
a. The opinion establishes a new rule or law or alters or modifies an existing
rule; or
b. The opinion involves a legal issue of continuing public interest; or
c. The opinion criticizes existing law; or
d. The opinion resolves an apparent conflict of authority.
Opinions of the court shall be published only if the majority of the judges
participating in the decision find that a standard for publication as set out in
section (1) of this rule is satisfied. Concurring opinions shall be published only
if the majority opinion is published. Dissenting opinions may be published if the
dissenting judge determines that a standard for publication as set out in section
(1) of this rule is satisfied. The (highest court) may order any unpublished opinion
of the (intermediate court) or a concurring or dissenting opinion in that court
published.
3. If the standard for publication as set out in section (1) of the rule is satisfied as to
only a part of an opinion, only that part shall be published.
4. The judges who decide the case shall consider the question of whether or not to publish
an opinion in the cases at the conference on the case before or at the time the writing
assignment is made, and at that time, if appropriate, they shall make a tentative decision
not to publish.
STAN ARDs FOR PUaLICTION OF JUDICIAL OPINIONS

(quoted in Walther, supra note 170, at 582 n.7).
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Commission on Standards of Judicial Administration'98 have drafted model rules.
Since 1974 the courts of appeals have been left to their own devices. The time
has come for rigorous evaluation and adoption of a uniform standard.'
The
variety of present rules provides a menu, and experience under them provides
a data base. An optimum uniform rule would create a presumption in favor
of publication, and require that a nonpublication choice be panel unanimous.
It would also list criteria for mandatory publication. The specifics of the proposal
2
should await further study. 111

198. The A.B.A. Standard reads, in part:
Publication of Opinions.
(a) Public Access. Opinions of an appellate court should be a matter of public record.
Parties should be provided copie,, of a decision and opinion when it is filed, even if general
dissemination is withheld [sic] until the opinion is in printed form.
(b) Formal Publication. An opinion of an appellate court should be published in the series
of printed volumes in which the opinions of the court appear only if, in the judgment of
the judges participating in the decision, it is one that:
(1) Establishes a new rule of law, alters or modifies an existing rule, or applies
an established rule to a novel fact situation;
(2) Involves a legal issue of continuing public interest;
(3) Criticizes existing law; or
(4) Resolves an apparent conflict of authority. A concurring or dissenting opinion should be published if its author believes it should be; if such an opinion is
published the majority opinion should be published as well.
ABA COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE
COURTS § 3.37 (Approved Draft 1977).
199. See Note, supra note 169, at 146-48.
200. Although their proposal is not without its flaws, Professors Reynolds and Richman have
developed a model rule that merits further consideration.
Rule - Opinions.
1. Minimum Standards:
Every decision will be accompanied by an opinion that sufficiently states the facts of
the case, its procedural stance and history, and the relevant legal authority so that the
basis for this court's disposition can be understood from the opinion and the authority
cited.
Publication of Opinions:
a. Criteria for Publication: An opinion will be published if it:
(1) establishes a new rule of law, or alters or modifies an existing rule of law,
or calls attention to an existing rule of law that appears to have been generally
overlooked;
(2) applies an established rule of law to facts significantly different from those
in previous applications of the rule;
(3) explains, criticizes, or reviews the history, application, or administration of
existing decisional or enacted law;
(4) creates or resolves a conflict of authority either within the circuit or between
this circuit and another;
(5) concerns or discusses a factual or legal issue of significant public interest;
(6) is accompanied by a concurring or dissenting opinion;
(7) reverses the decision below, unless:
(a) the reversal is caused by an intervening change in law or fact, or
(b) the reversal is a remand (without further comment) to the district
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D.

Case Management Plans

As part of their response to caseload pressures, several courts of appeals
have experimented with civil appeals management plans, acronymically known
as CAMP.20 ' Although these plans differed in their particulars, they had common goals, albeit with different emphasis: 20 2 (1) encouraging the resolution of
appeals without court action; (2) accelerating the consideration and disposition
of those appeals that go to argument; (3) clarifying the issues and improving
the quality of briefs and arguments; and (4) resolving motions and procedural
matters informally and expeditiously. Techniques include appeal tracking forms
that allow processing to begin before filing of the record on appeal and briefs,
staff tailoring and monitoring of the briefing schedule, case weighting and early
20 3
assignment to panels, and, most importantly a pre-hearing conference.
The pre-hearing conference takes place before briefing. A staff attorney administers the conference. It is attended by attorneys for both sides, who discuss
the issues on appeal - freely and in confidence from the court. 204 During that
conference,, the staff attorney explores the possibility of a nonjudicial resolution,
develops possible stipulations, narrows the issues, and attempts to anticipate
and resolve a variety of procedural issues by consent, such as a stay and the
content of the joint appendix. Although encouragement of a nonjudicial resolution is an important emphasis, other features of the case management plans
advance those appeals that do not settle.
The feasibility and effectivenss of case management plans that use a prehearing conference as a principal mechanism must be considered circuit-by-

court of a case reversed or remanded by the Supreme Court;
(8) addresses a lower court or administrative agency decision that has been
published; or
(9) is an opinion in a disposition that
(a) has been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, or
(b) is a remand of a case from the United States Supreme Court.
b. Publication Decision: There shall be a presumption in favor of publication. An
opinion shall be published unless each member of the panel deciding the case determines
that it fails to meet the criteria for publication.
3. The court recognizes that the decision of a case without oral argument and without
publication is a substantial abbreviation of the traditional appellate process and will employ
both devices in a single case only when the appeal is patently frivolous.
Reynolds & Richman, supra note 166, at 626-28 (citations omitted).

201. See infra text accompanying notes 252-55. See generally Goldman, The Civil Appeals Management Plan: An Experiment in Appellate Procedural Reform, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1209 (1978); Kaufman,
The Pre-Argument Conference: An Appellate Procedural Reform, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1094 (1974).

202. Plans were implemented and evaluated in the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits. See L. FARMER, APPEAs EXPEDIrrNG SYSTEMS: AN EVALUATION OF SECOND & EIGHTH
(1981); J. GOLDMAN, THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT PREAPPEAL PROGRAM: AN EVAL(1982); Rack, Pre-Argument Conferences in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 15 U. ToL. L.
921 (1984). Cf. FED. R. APP. P. 33 (providing for a prehearing conference at the court's

CIRCUIT PROCEDURES
UATION
REV.

direction).

203.
204.

See generally J. GOLDMAN, supra note 202.
See generally A. PARTRIDGE & A. LIND, A
AEMErNT PLAN (1983); Rack, supra note 202.
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circuit.2 0 5 Two considerations dominate the evaluation. 20 6 First, in a court with
a backlog of cases awaiting argument, attorney readiness need not be accelerated, although enhancement of presentation quality remains important. The
prospect of long delay in those circuits may in fact increase settlement pressures,
although no studies have been done. Second, geography becomes a problem
for larger circuits in arranging face-to-face conferences. Distances and expenses
0 7
have been overcome, however, by telephone conferencing in some circuits
20 8
and staff attorneys might ride circuit.
Circuit-by-circuit evaluations suggest some inevitable consequences of case
management plans.2 1 9 Plans characterized by a pre-hearing conference reduced
the number of motions that judges had to decide, shortened the joint appendix,
reduced the delay between briefing and argument, and reduced the time from
notice of appeal to termination. Although briefs were not significantly shorter,
there was some suggestion of their improved quality. Interestingly, the impact
on the settlement rate is unclear. In some experiences the plan had a substantial
effect on the settlement rates, and in others no substantial differences were
discernible.2 ' The literature on the plans seems to indicate that their benefits
outweigh their costs without considering the effect on settlement rates; but their
real potential and ultimate justification will rest on settlement impact. That
dimension remains uncertain and merits further experimentation and study. This
task will be difficult, but developing a profile of the appeal with a high probability of settlement is a worthy endeavor. 21 ' Scarce resources and extra efforts
could then be spent more judiciously than in a plan that treated appeals as
fungible.
E.

Staff

As one barometer of change in the federal judicial institution, consider that
over the decades of the 1960's and 1970's the number of support personnel

205. Modern internal operating procedures of courts of appeals without formal plans and
conferences do include monitoring and facilitating by central court staff. See Johnson, Time Delays
in the Fifth Circuit - From Docketing to Decision - Civil and Criminal Cases, 2 F'rH CIR. REP. 345
(1985). See also Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 214.
206. A. PARTRIDGE & A. LIND, supra note 204, at 10-11.
207. Rack, supra note 202, at 923 n.7.
208. A. PARTRIDGE & A. LIND', supra note 204, at 10.
209. See generally j. GOLDMAN, supra note 202, at 42-43 (Seventh Circuit); A. PARTRIDGE & A.
LIND, supra note 204, at 10-11 (Second Circuit). CAMP procedures must be distinguished from
two alternative approaches: The bygone view of treating every appeal alike and the summary
calendar system already discussed. CAMP has both strengths and weaknesses. Volume remains a
problem. Many cases are treated very preemptorily in a CAMP circuit under heavy docket pressure.
A staff attorney handling the conference might not always review the record and carefully study
the issue. Under the summary calendar approach, the judges seem to be more in control.
210. See Rack, supra note 202, at 934 ("a substantial number of settlements"). Compare J.
GOLDMAN, supra note 202, at 42-43 (Seventh Circuit no difference) with A. PARTRIDGE & A.
LIND, supra note 204, at 10-11 (Second Circuit - substantial difference).
211.
"After trying for almost a year to select cases with high settlement potential, the [Sixth
Circuit] program staff could discern no factors reliably predictive of settlement." Rack, supra note
202, at 926.
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increased threefold. 212 Support personnel in the offices of the clerks of court
and in the judge's chambers represent the first line of defense against oppressive
dockets. The actual management of an appeal involves a number of people in
the clerk's office. 21 3 Court reporter management schemes call for day-to-day
management and supervision of an efficient court reporting service. The case
manager handles all case management functions from docketing to the final
issuance of the mandate. Staff attorneys conduct prescreening assessments of
the appeals. Administering oral argument, filing, word processing, handling the
voluminous mail, and library maintenance all demand substantial personnel
resources. Circuit executives and their staff facilitate nonjudicial responsibilities
of the court. In chambers, law clerks and secretaries aid the judge. The court
family is large, indeed. For purposes of this discussion, administrative personnel
will be distinguished from decisional personnel. While commentators have largely
ignored the former group, 214 the latter group, made up of staff attorneys and
law clerks, has received a fair amount of attention because of its direct involvement in the decisionmaking process. Two related responses to the press
of heavier caseloads have been to provide judges with more law clerks and to
delegate judicial responsibilities to staff attorneys.
During the docket crisis, both
21 5
groups have assumed a greater prominence.

Much has been written about the origins and development of the law clerk
from clerical assistant to an institution in itself. 216 The federal court of appeals
experience may be briefly described. 2 7 Until relatively recently, each federal
judge had only one law clerk whose role was "testing the judge's work" by
21 8
criticizing opinion drafts and arguments, and acting as a sounding board.

212. Clark, Adjudication to Administration:A StatisticalAnalysis of Federal District Courts in the Twentieth Century, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 65, 144 (1981). Judicial personnel, both article III and article
I, also have increased dramatically. See infra text accompanying notes 336-89.
213. The position names change, but the responsibilities are the same, from circuit to circuit.
Fifth Circuit terms will be employed here. See generally Johnson, supra note 205, at 246-50.
214. See generally Re, 7he Administration of Jstice and the Courts, 18 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1 (1984);

Rubin, supra note 47, at 654. More attention needs to be afforded administrative efficiencies. See
infra text accompanying notes 239-335.

215. See

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,

REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE

U.S., H.R. Doc. No. 117, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 69-70 (1981) (the
number of staff attorneys is limited to the number of judges on the court). Compare Act of June
17, 1930, ch. 509, 46 Stat. 774 (repealed 1969) (providing a law clerk for each court of
appeals judge) with 28 U.S.C. § 712 (1948) (providing for appointment of "necessary law clerks").
Two law clerks per judge were authorized in 1969 and a third in 1979. See Act of December 24,
1969, Pub. L. No. 91-153, 83 Stat. 403; Act of September 24, 1977, Pub. L. No. 96-68, 93 Stat.
416, 428.
216. See generally Baier, The Law Clerks. Profile of an Institution, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1125 (1974);
Newland, Personal Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 OR. L. REV. 299 (1961);
Wright, Observations of an Appellate Judge: The Use of Law Clerks, 26 VAND. L. REV. 1179 (1974).

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE

Not all of the commentary has been complimentary. See Kester, The Law Clerk Explosion, 9

LITIGATION

20 (1983).
217. For a consideration of comparable state court developments, see generally D.
supra note 15, at 31-137.

MEADOR,

218. McCree, supra note 43, at 786-87.
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Second and third law clerks were added as in-chambers assistants and central
staff attorney positions were established. Today's ratio of authorized decisional
personnel to judges is approximately four to one, a dramatic increase from the
1969 level of about one to one. 21 9 An appellate judge's principal efforts take
place in chambers: reading briefs, studying records, considering arguments,
deciding, and writing opinions. Judging is deciding; that is the exercise of the
article III power.
The worry of several commentators is that the clerk's role in the reading,
studying, considering, and writing has encroached significantly on that of the
judge. 220 Judges have responded that the opinion writing process demands some
trade-off among functions. 22' They explain that the core function, the deciding,
still resides with the judge, but that more and more of the opinion preparation
function has been delegated to the law clerk. The workload, they contend, has
forever changed the roles of clerk and judge. Judges decide the result and sketch
a rationale. Law clerks prepare a draft opinion. Judges edit the draft. This has
become the federal appellate paradigm. 222 Appellate judges have joined the ranks
of "senior partners, high government officials, and professors" who "scrupulously review and edit"

the preliminary work of their junior associates.

223

Su-

pervision and delegation, however, are in inverse proportion in this new order."'
The workload has dramatically changed the relationship between judge and law
clerk.
A return to the days of one law clerk, having a negligible role, is not
feasible. By a judge's own estimate, a judge single-handedly researching and
writing each opinion could produce a dozen or so opinions a year, and the
courts of appeals would be overrun. 225 The increase in number of clerks should,
however, be ceased. Although the limits of delegation and supervision may not
have been surpassed, they have certaintly been reached.22 6 Multiplying judicial
clerkships any more would jeopardize the tradition that federal judges are re227
spectful because they do their own work.
Even proponents admit that increasing the number of law clerks would result
in diminishing marginal returns. The judge who remains a judge becomes something of a bottleneck as appeals move through the chambers only as fast as

219.
220.

See Posner, supra note 37, at 767.
See McCree, supra note 43, at 785-87; Vining, Justice, Bureaucracy, and Legal Method, 80
MicH. L. REv. 248, 252-53 (1981).
221. See Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 217-18; Posner, supra note 37, at 769; Wald, supra note 29, at
778.
222. See Posner, supra note 37, at 769; Wald, supra note 29, at 778.
223. See Wald, supra note 29, at 778.
224. Supervising and coordinating a tripled staff of assistants place additional demands on the
judicial resource. Posner, supra note 37, at 767-68.
225. See Wald, supra note 29, at 777. Even outside Judge Wald's District of Columbia Circuit
with its complex cases, the productivity would not be too much higher.
226. "In any event, it seems to me undesireable that we move beyond three clerks " McCrec,
supra note 43, at 787. See also Kester, supra note 216, at 62.
227. C. WYZANSKI, WHEREAS: A JUDGE'S PREMISES 61 (1965).
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the judge can review, evaluate, and act on recommendation and drafts. 228 Staff
attorneys, as an alternative, work for the court as a whole rather than for an
individual judge. There is something of a paradox here. 229 Unless the staff
attorneys are doing work that otherwise would be done by judges, they do not
increase the court's productivity. Yet, if they do perform some of the judge's
duties, the judicial function is usurped. The philosophical resoli'tion of this
paradox assigns to staff attorneys tasks that have been, but need not be, performed by judges. 231 Such a resolution, however, is not easily accomplished.
The various courts of appeals have experimented with the job description of
the staff attorney. Many of their results represent uncomfortable choices made
in the face of the workload. 23' One judge explains that it is the staff attorney
who
acquires a case at the moment the notice of appeal is filed, shepherds
it through each procedural step until the closing brief is in, prepares
legal memoranda, drafts a proposed opinion or other disposition, recommends gran~t or denial of oral argument, 232
and presents the complete
package to the judges to be graded pass/fail.
The key assumption here is that these tasks need not be performed by judges.
The motions process, for example, no longer simply sends along the matter for
judicial consideration and action. Before the motion reaches a judge, a staff
attorney reviews it and prepares a memorandum explaining the motion and
recommending a disposition with an attached proposed order. 23 3 Admittedly,
these staff attorney evaluations save a substantial amount of judge time. Deciding whether a case deserves oral argument and how a case should be decided,
however, lie at the core of the judicial function. A major concern is that the
widespread dependence on staff attorneys has created a bureaucratic judicial
234
process.
The premise of the staff attorney position is that one staff attorney does the
work of three law clerks, one in each panel member's chambers. 235 Critics of
the expansion of central staff attorney responsibility echo the concerns expressed
in regard to the expansion of law clerk responsibility. Both types of legal assistants encroach on the judging responsibility, but the situation is worse with
the staff attorney because the supervision present with the elbow law clerk is

228. See Gammon, The Central Staff Attorneys' Office in the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth
Circuit a Five Year Report, 29 S.D.L. REv. 457, 457 (1984).
229. See Hellman, supra note 31, at 940-41. See generally Gammon, supra note 228; Ubell, Report
on Central Staff Attorney's Offices in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 F.R.D. 253 (1980).
230. See Hellman, supra note 31, at 940-41.

231.
232.
233.
Court of
234.
235.

For a circuit by circuit review, see generally Ubell, supra note 229.
Hufstedler, The Appellate Process Inside Out, 50 CAL. ST. B.J. 20, 22 (1975).
See Hellman, supra note 31, at 944. See also Hebman, Motions Practice in the United States
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 12 U. TOL. L. REV. 485 (1981).
See McCree, supra note 43, at 788.
See Ubell, supra note 229, at 263.
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lacking. 2 6 Proponents, on the other hand, maintain that the harsh reality of
caseload demand prevents judges from doing everything they once did. Staff
attorneys perform tasks low on the judicial scale, thus allowing judges to perform
the important appellate tasks that oblige an article III decisionmaker. Conceding
the departure from appellate traditions, proponents assert that the wise use of
237
central staff attorneys does more good than harm.
The proponents of an expanded use of staff attorneys and law clerks, however, rest their arguments on an unstable foundation. With three law clerks
and one staff attorney for each appeals judge, the judges are at the limit of
their ability to supervise subordinate decisional personnel.2 3 Thus, adding more
law clerks or more staff attorneys is no longer an acceptable method of coping
with the caseload.
F.

Miscellaneous Reform Proposals

Intramural reforms take many shapes. Possible changes in how the courts
of appeals perform their role and function are not limited to those described
in the preceding sections. Other reforms, presently under experimentation, and
others still on the drawing board, deserve brief mention. These proposals represent mostly tinkering with the coping mechanisms already in place. Admittedly, no one can oppose better court management until costs must be paid in
terms of money, judicial resources, and appellate ideals.23 9 Both reforms achieved
and reforms proposed invoke such familiar themes as working harder, delegating
more authority, stream-lining procedures, and rationing resources along prior240
ities.
I.

Better Legislation

The first consideration is for Congress. Judge Edwards has complained that
the courts of appeals are choking on "ambiguous and internally inconsistent
statutes." 241 Incoherence, vagueness, and conflicting purposes all burden judicial
resources and decisional division. More careful drafting and a clear statement
of purpose are required. 2 2 Vague legislation is not the sole product of ineptness;
characteristically, the legislative process is full of compromise and agreements
achieved through escapes to higher levels of abstraction. Congress is unlikely to
change even though the vagaries of the legislative process frequently are more

236. See Posner, supra note 37, at 775; Wald, supra note 29, at 778-79. See generally Cameron,
The Central Staff: A New Solution to a' Old Problem, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 465, 479 (1976).
237. See Gammon, supra note 228, at 446; Hellman, supra note 31, at 1003.
238. See P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 48 (two law clerks and one central staff attorney
is the limit).
239. J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 274.
240. Id. For an outline of the present national administrative structure and contemporary
problems with some suggestions for centralized reform, see generally Meador, The FederalJudiciary
and Its Future Administration, 65 VA. L. REV. 1031 (1979).
241. See Edwards, supra note 3, at 424-25 (footnotes omitted).
242. Id. at 425-26
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263

frustrating to the courts. Congress can do more, however, to remedy outmoded
judicial statutes, answer unanticipated questions, and reconcile conflicting statutory schemes. 243 Legislative responsiveness is preferable to legislative inaction
2 44
or judicial legislating.
Such obligations are generally within the legitimate expectations of Congress.
Appellate federal jurisdiction is a scarce resource that must be rationed.2 45 Congress must be forced to rank the competing demands on the appellate resources,
recognizing that the docket demand outstrips decisional supply and that deficits
in jurisdiction debase the appellate remedy. Congress must articulate a hierarchy
of appeals. Thus far it has only identified a large number of preferred categories
of appeals without any internal consistency. 2 4 Once this uniquely political process equalizes supply and demand and assigns supply priorities, Congress must
not practice deficit jurisdiction. For the solution to be long lasting, Congress
must monitor and maintain the equilibrium. Just as important, Congress must
consider jurisdictional impact statements and expressly reorder the hierarchy
with each new statute that has an impact on the federal appellate docket. This
idea is not new. Chief Justice Burger first urged such impact statements in
2 48
1970.247 Such an approach is needed today more than ever.
2.

Technology

The appellate judiciary must do its part in the administrative realm. Few
proposals go beyond the reforms in place; administrative reforms have been all
but exhausted. A few recently proposed innovations, however, merit brief mention. Sometimes taken for granted and too often overlooked, technology and
its application should be of strong interest to those concerned with appellate
court reform. State of the art hardware is a minimum requirement. That means
at the least, word processing equipment and related electronic document transfer
capability.2 49 Several courts of appeals are presently experimenting with direct
25 0
electronic transmission of opinions between chambers and to the publisher.
But the need goes beyond hardware. Further research and development is required in the area of computer-based case and court management information

243. Id. at 427.
244. Id. at 427-29.
245. Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 85.
246.

Id. at 82-85 n.333. See generally The Impact of Civil Expediting Provisions on the United States

Courts of Appeals, 37 Rac. A.B. CIr N.Y. 19 (1982) (a discussion of appellate priority and proposals
for reform).
247. See Burger, The State of the FederalJudiciayy -

1972, 58 A.B.A. J. 1049, 1050 (1972).
MD. L. REv. 659, 671-72

248. See Meyer, Justice, Bureaucracy, Structure, and Simplification, 42
(1983); Rubin, supra note 47, at 658.
249.

See Wallace, Our Judicial System Needs Help: A Few Inside Thoughts, 12 U.S.F. L.

REv. 3,

13-14 (1977). Today Judge Wallace's plea for help has been answered. Word processing equipment
is in place in all the courts of appeals. Still the need for updating and improving remains.
250. Frank, The Rush Is On, 71 A.B.A. J. 32 (1985). See generallyJ. GREENWOOD & L. FARMER,
THE IMPACT OF WORD PROCESSING AND ELECTRONIC MAIL ON UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS

(1979) (a look at test results showing judges' ability to save time through use of electronic equipment).
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systems. 251 Possible applications of technology include video conferences and
even video arguments with judges and attorneys simultaneously appearing before
camera. Such innovations should be encouraged and subsidized.
3.

Administrative Units

Congress has recognized the peculiar administrative problems of the so-called
super-circuits, the large courts of appeals. In 1978, section 6 of the Omnibus
Judgeship Act authorized courts of appeals with more than fifteen active judges
to reorganize themselves internally into administrative units and to reorder its
en banc procedures by court rule. 252 Only the former Fifth Circuit253 (before
creation of the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits) and the Ninth Circuit, 1 4 however, qualified and implemented administrative unit plans. These plans served
to decentralize the clerks' offices but accomplished little else. In any event, the
provision is of limited applicability because only the new Fifth, the Sixth, and
the Ninth Circuits have the qualifying number of judges.'4.

Differentiated Case Management

The principle of differentiated case management has been the most common
response to the docket growth of the last twenty-five years. Most significant for
the appellate ideal has been a trend away from managing and processing each
case uniformly, and toward adoption of differentiated case management. 5 6 While
at first an unconscious byproduct of coping with docket growth, this trend has
become the guiding principle of the federal appellate process. The larger circuits
have led the way. A hallmark of this case management approach is monitoring
each stage of an appeal: notice of appeal, briefing, submission, and decision.
The large circuits have relied on case screening to assign cases to the argument
or nonargument calendar. Such plans are extolled and their extension recom257
mended.

251.
Nikon & Wheeler, Using Technology to Improve the Administration of Justice in the Federal Courts,
1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 659.
252. See Act of October 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 41 (Supp. II 1978)).
253. Baker, A Primer on Precedent in the Eleventh Circuit, 34 MERCER L. REV. 1175, 1178-79
(1983).
254. Deane & Tehan, Judicial Administration in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, 11 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1981).
255. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
98 Stat. 333 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 44 (Supp. 1985)). The Ninth Circuit has experimented with
a limited en banc panel. See Deane & Tehan, supra note 254, at 14-15. See also JUDICIAL COUNCIL
OF THE NINTH CIR., SECOND BIENNIkL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 6 OF
THE OMNIBUS JUDGESHIP ACT OF 1978 AND OTHER MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE WITHIN THE NINTH CIRCUIT (July 1984).
256. Whittaker, Differentiated Case Management in United States Courts of Appeals, 63 F R.D. 457,
458 (1974).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 113-28. See generally Rubin & Ganucheau, Appellate Delay
and Cost - An Ancient and Common Disease: Is It Intractable?, 42 MD. L. REV. 752 (1983).
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Another proposal worthy of serious consideration within a case management
scheme is a sua sponte dismissal process for lack of jurisdiction. Private and
judicial resources may be wasted by the failure to consider jurisdiction at the
threshold. 258 At times litigants and judges lose sight of the federal judicial role
as limited courts of a limited sovereign. 259 An appeal brought outside the court
of appeals' jurisdiction is beyond its power to decide, and the court is obliged
to dismiss, even sua sponte. 260 Although no system can identify every jurisdictional defect, some courts have experimented successfully with formal jurisdiction
screening. 26 1 Screening might be accomplished as early as the notice of appeal
stage or in the principal brief. 262 Such a system could save appreciable appellate
resources with a minimal investment.
5.

Inventorying Cases

Proposals to screen cases for argument or nonargument calendars show signs
of developing into a broader approach of differentiating appeals, sometimes
called "inventorying." More complete control over case flow requires more
complete monitoring as well as early classification. Inventorying provides more
useful information at each stage of the appellate process.
Consider briefly the Ninth Circuit's system. 263 A staff attorney obtains a
full set of briefs and checks first for jurisdiction. Next, an inventory card is
prepared with essential information, and the issues on appeal are identified and
classified. Along with a brief summary, the staff attorney suggests a weight;
that is, an estimate of the relative amount of judicial time required for resolution. The weight is the used to equalize panel workloads.
Issue classification encourages the assignment of similar appeals to a single
panel to avoid duplication and inconsistent resolution. Such clustering gives the
judges a broader perspective on the issues and contributes to a more comprehensive series of decisions. Recurring issues are identified in several manifestations to allow for greater guidance to the trial courts and the bar. Inventorying
264
assesses subject matter and difficulty to provide a basis for differentiation.
Similar cases can be dealt with together. Difficult cases may be culled for
complete review. A well-developed coding system even permits computerization. 265 Computerization allows a judge or law clerk to ascertain essential information from a glance at a printout. Computer sorting and retrieval facilitates
case differentiation for appropriate procedures and identifies trial and appellate

258. See, e.g., Gillette Co. v. Miner, 459 U.S. 86 (1982).
259. Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 6-7.
260. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1981).
261. Meyer, supra note 248, at 693.
262. The Fifth Circuit requires that "[e]ach principal brief shall include a concise statement
of the statutory or other basis of the jurisdiction of this Court, contaiting citations of authority
when necessary." 5TH CIR. R. 28.2.5.
263.
264.
265.

See generally Hellman, supra note 31, at 957-64.
Meador, supra note 74, at 259-81.
Deane & Tehan, supra note 254, at 10.
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court patterns. 2" For example, cases ripe for preargument conference and set267
tlement might be identified.
Another system of inventorying is the District of Columbia's approach to
the identified "big cases." ' 21 81 A "big case" typically involves an important
administrative issue or a large and complicated record. Preargument conferences
are used to clarify issues and consolidate the record. Oral arguments are arranged by subject area rather than by party. Post-argument memoranda and
conferences might aid opinion preparation on highly technical questions. Thus,
inventorying identifies the cases calling for peculiar procedural adjustments.
6.

Fast Track Appeals

Inventorying may also be used to identify appeals appropriate for a "fast
track" process and for monitoring their disposition. Expedited appeals are nothing new. 269 A consistent goal has been to reduce the docket by reducing the
time in the briefing, argument, and decision sequence. Some courts have experimented with an interesting variation. When the parties voluntarily elect the
fast track after briefing, the court advances the case on its docket. The court
may then allow oral argument, and announce a decision without opinion. 70
Speed is the obvious advantage of this procedure. The attorneys are allowed
full participation. Just as obvious, the chief disadvantage is the lost opinion,
a real concern under the appellate ideal. 27 ' But notice that here the parties,
rather than the court, make the choice. Admittedly, this election undercuts some
of the earlier criticisms.
7.

Greater Orality

One recent proposal reevaluates the deemphasis of oral argument in federal
appeals. Professor Meador has called for greater orality.2 12 In his proposal,
written filings would be kept to a minimum and oral argument would have no
time limit. The success of this approach would depend upon counsels' pres-

266. Hellman, supra note 31, at 961.
267. See supra text accompanying notes 201-11. The benefits of inventorying should not be
overstated. "Evening up" the workload of each judge or each panel does not add anything appreciable to the quality of judging. Furthermore, inventorying is symptomatic; the more current
the docket the fewer the opportunities for grouping similar appeals. Ultimately, the issue is whether
the benefit outweighs the cost.
268. Loventhal, Appellate Procedures: Design, Patchwork, and Managed Flexibility, 23 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 432, 444-47 (1976).
269. See supra text accompanying notes 113-200.
270. See D.C. CIR. R. 13(c); Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 221.
271.
See supra text accompanying notes 137-200. See generally Perry, The Fast Track" Accelerated
Disposition of Civil Appeals in the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 6 OKL.. CiTY L. REV. 453 (1981) (an
overview and discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of Oklahoma's fast track); Lay, Reconciling Tradition with Reality: The Expedited Appeal, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 419 (1976) (suggestions
on how to decrease the time from notice of appeal to final disposition).
272. See Meador, Toward Orality and Visibility in the Appellate Process, 42 MD. L. REV. 732 (1983).
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entation of argument and authority, the judges' questions, and the judges'
ability to confer with each other during and after argument. 273 Similar to the
English tradition, this approach would combine oral argument and court conference in one proceeding. Inventorying would be necessary, either to identify
whole categories of cases or to screen cases for assignment to the oral track.
24
Several experiments suggest the soundness of Professor Meador's proposal.
It could not become the exclusive model, however. Orality proves inefficient
in many situations: (1) when the case is complex; (2) when the issues are
numerous and sophisticated; (3) when the trial transcript is delayed; (4) when
the backlog would delay argument long after trial; (5) when the court is not
convenient to the bar; and (6) when the judges are resistent. Greater orality
sounds good, and it lends itself to routine cases that involve common legal
principles. Difficult issues, however, require substantial advance work by judges.
Written briefs promote efficient resolution of these issues. Furthermore, the
variety of legal issues confronting the courts of appeals makes it difficult to
attain the mastery required by complete orality. Nevertheless, orality could
provide an efficient option within an inventory system for the truly commonplace
appeals.
8.

Maintaining Judicial Productivity

Proposals for reform within the existing appellate structure are not limited
to non-decisional, administrative matters. Many judges and commentators have
suggested ways to improve the judging art. These suggestions have peculiar
application to the courts of appeals. In short, they ask that judges do more
and do better.
If the appellate ideal is to be realized, judges must have time for study,
deliberation and collegiality. Oral argument panel participations require preparation. The courts of appeals now appear at their limit of effective operation,
averaging one week of oral arguments per month. 275 Of course, memorandum
opinions would increase productivity by allowing more nonargument calendar
cases to be decided.

276

Deadlines would also force judges to do more. 27 7 The Supreme Court follows
a term-end deadline for all decisions in cases argued each term. Lawyers must
live with briefing deadlines. Similar restrictions would be appropriate for appellate judges. The District of Columbia Circuit, for example, has imposed
internal procedures that (1) bar judges from hearing cases in a new term if
they have not circulated draft opinions in more than three cases argued at least

273. Id. at 749.
274. Besides the English and early American experience, simulations in Arizona, Colorado,
and California have been well-received. Id. at 738-47.
275. Carrington, supra note 24, at 558; Wright, supra note 74, at 962.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 137-200.
277. Wald, The Problem with Courts, 20 TRIAL 28, 33 (1984) ("One thing courts need is deadlines.").
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six months previously, and (2) require judges to respond to a circulated draft
within seven days, and authorize the writing judge to release the opinion after
thirty days pass without dissent.2 78 Such measures merit study and, perhaps,
more widespread application.
9.

Two-Judge Panels

Another possible way to increase productivity without creating additional
judgeships involves rethinking the three-judge panel. 279 A three-judge panel has
been the federal tradition and the American norm for an intermediate court
sitting in panels.2 01 On occasion, however, one member has been unable to
continue and a quorum of two has decided the appeal usually with no untoward
result. 281' This exception could be made the rule. In the run of federal appeals,
two judges would be sufficient, if they agreed, and a third could be brought
in only when the two could not agree. 282 In fact, the routine nonargument case
generally proceeds in this manner, as an initiating judge drafts a proposed
opinion and solicits a second vote.
This proposal, however, contains some distinct disadvantages.2 83 One fewer
perspective might reduce the quality of decision. It might also increase the
influence of law clerks and staff attorneys as decisionmaking becomes more inchambers than between chambers. The entire decisionmaking process would be
changed, perhaps in unknown ways, by moving from a triad to a dyad. The
dyad necessarily would be less representative of the whole court. The frequency
of division is not predictable. Arrayed against these concerns is the savings of
one-third of the judgepower now expended. Inventorying also might select proper
cases for this truncated panel.
10.

Improving Judicial Decisionmaking

Several related and modest proposals suggest ways the courts of appeals
could perform better. These proposals are not meant to degrade the quality of
the courts' work. 28 4 However, the federal legal system can be made more "intelligible. ' 28 5 No one could oppose this reform. The trick is how to accomplish

278. Wald, supra note 29, at 785. See also Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 215.
279. Utilizing senior judges, visiting judges, and district judges as a third panel member also
would avoid the creation of additional court of appeals judgeships. See infra text accompanying notes
336-89. Almost all that can be done in this regard, however, has already been done. See generally
Carrington, supra note 24, at 563-66.
280. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982); A.B.A. COMM'N ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMIN., STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT ORGANIZATION, Standard 1.13(b)(iv) (1974).
281. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) (1982).
282. Meador, supra note 74, at 281-82. See generally AMERICAN B. FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE
WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED STATES

COURTS OF APPEALS

(1968).

283. See generally Carrington, supra note 24, at 561-63.
284. "[N]o one will understand me to be speaking with disrespect ... [for] one may criticize
even what one reveres." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 473 (1897).
285. Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 19.
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it. As a beginning point, judges must recognize that they administer the law
in partnership with the bar. Indeed, on a day-to-day basis the286principal administrators of the law are the lawyers at work in their offices.
This idea of partnership between bench and bar has a significant ramification
for the attorney. First, the bar must shoulder some of the blame for what has
2 7
That attitude contribbeen called the "Let's Everybody Litigate" mentality.
288
can no longer
attorneys
appeal,
on
once
Second,
utes to clogged dockets.
intact. 289
remained
has
process
traditional
brief and argue cases as though the
Modern appellate procedures barely resemble those of a less litigious era. Reducing expectations and demands through limits on briefing and arguing would
be beneficial. Indeed, the resourceful advocate takes advantage of the modernized procedure. Clearer, shorter, more definitive opinions make the work of
both judges and lawyers more effective.
Judges must do their part to make the law more understandable, more
predictable and hence, more administrable. 2 9 This goal has an important byproduct. The more certain the law, the more predictable the outcome, and
appeal is less likely. This is important because the most effective way to reduce
291
Part of this
the appellate workload is to reduce the number of appeals filed.
on the
decided
must
be
certainty arises from principled decisionmaking. Gases
application.
of
common
principles
articulated
basis of general,
In the majority of decisions, courts can simply identify and apply the principle in the common law tradition. But the role of the judge is not so limited,
as Judge Edwards, Circuit Judge for the District of Columbia Circuit, has
explained. 292 He has described the importance of the judge's role in a few
contexts of what he calls "wide-angled adjudication.' '293 When an appeal presents a specific type of recurring problem, disposes of an enormously important
problem, or presents an opportunity for clarification of existing law with the
anticipation of future litigation, then Judge Edwards argues for a broader decisional sense.2 94 Wide-angled decisionmaking requires a broader analysis and
prediction to better guide attorneys and future courts. On such occasions, the
2 95
At first this
court must provide a clear, precise, and fully-reasoned decision.
and
clarity. But
brevity
to
exhortation
position seems at odds with the earlier
use
and
discriminating
selective
by
served
in the long run, the law is better
the
apuse
of
in
the
is
discrimination
The
key
of wide-angled adjudication.
proach.

286.

Id.

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Rosenberg, Let's Everybody Litigate?, 5 TEx. L. REv. 1349 (1972).
Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 19.
Meador, supra note 74, at 293.
Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 19-20.
Rubin, Views from theLower Court, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 448, 451 (1976).
See Edwards, supra note 3, at 413.
Id.
See id. at 413-14.
Id. at 419.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1985

45

Florida Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

270

[Vol. XXXVII

Such discrimination leads to a sensitive subject, without mention of which
no federal jurisdiction article would be complete: judicial restraint. Judicial
restraint in the present context means the court of appeals should abide by the
appellate ideal vis-a-vis the district court. As explained before, the federal court
system must remain integrated, with decisionmaking power concentrated at the
lowest level. 296 Statutes, precedents, and rules of court define the appellate role
to consider only those questions within its scope of authority. 297 The courts of
appeals must discontinue the trend of drawing power to themselves and away
from the trial courts.298
11.

Advisors

While the foregoing proposals are largely aspirational and noncontroversial,
one more concrete suggestion for reform has recently resurfaced amidst mild
disagreement. The idea is to provide judges access to expert advisors. The idea
is not new; thirty years ago Judge Wyzanski appointed an economist as his
law clerk during a complex antitrust trial. 299 In its preliminary report, the
Hruska Commission 00 suggested that a pool of scientific advisors be created to
function analogously to law clerks in appeals calling for high level sophistication
in science and technology.3 0 ' The preliminary suggestion was withdrawn, due
to critical reaction primarily concerned with the possibility that information and
arguments might reach the decisionmaker without knowledge of the parties and
without being tested by the adversary process.30 2 More recently, an Eighth Circuit
panel hired a university professor as a contract consultant to prepare reports
and memoranda to assist the court in understanding the record in a difficult
Investment Companies Act case. " ' The panel allowed the parties to respond
to the consultant's reports and the parties bore no expenses from the experiment. t Because the reports incorporated materials dehors the record, the Su15
preme Court criticized the practice. 0

296. Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 81.
297. Carrington, supra note 24, at 562.
298. Id. See generally Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REv. 751
(1957). But see Goldbold, Fact Finding by Appellate Courts - An Available and Appropriate Power, 12
CUM. L. REV. 365 (1982) (appellate fact finding is proper and does not injure the judicial system).
299. See Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV.
509, 552-53 (1974).
300. See supra text accompanying notes 93-100.
301.

COMM'N

ON REVISION

TERNAL PROCEDURES:

OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM,

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE,

A PRELIMINARY REPORT

STRUCTURE AND
83 (1975)

IN-

(quoted

in Hellman, supra note 31, at 983).
302. The sequence of events is chronicled in T. MARVELL, supra note 15, at 353 n.17, Hellman,
supra note 31, at 981-82.
303. Collins v. SEC, 532 F.2d 584, 605 n.40 (8th Cir. 1976).
304. Id.
305. "We are not cited to any statute, rule, or decision authorizing the procedure employed
by the Court of Appeals." E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 57 (1977)
.
(citations omitted). But cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the Supreme Court, using a similar
approach, did not allow response to additional material); Meyer, supra note 248, 679-80.
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The appellate ideal seemingly will not countenance anyone but the judges
roaming beyond the record. Brandeis briefs, solicited supplemental briefs, and
amicus curiae appearances, however, are all part of the appellate tradition and
serve the same purpose. Perhaps, the Court has implied that these are sufficient,
and properly so. Generally, expert witnesses, like all witnesses, should be limited
to the trial courtroom.3 0 6 Court-appointed experts at trial are subject to careful
restrictions providing for notice and adversary evaluation.30 7 If an appellate judge
cannot comprehend a factual record so carefully constructed, the solution may
be to assign the controversy outside the adversary process altogether. Additionally, no justification exists for referring legal questions. Judges are the experts on the law. In sum, article III decisionmaking requires an article III
3

decisionmaker.

1

8

12.

Frivolous Appeals

One last proposal for intramural reform merits special emphasis. It may
represent the most significant reform in the category, yet has gone virtually
unused until recently. While their jurisdiction is for Congress alone to change,
the courts of appeals show signs of ending the tradition of unimpeded appellate
309
access by imposing sanctions in frivolous appeals.
The prevailing perception of the docket crisis is that a large number of
appeals are frivolous or hopeless, and simply drain judicial resources for naught.3 10
In criminal cases, both paying and indigent defendants have profound incentives
to appeal, and indigent appellants have no costs or disincentives at all. 311 Sanctions for frivolous appeals are therefore best considered in civil cases. Courts
impose sanctions for compensation and deterrence: compensation to the opposing party for the time and expense of the appeal; deterrence to those who
would take the wasteful appeal, thereby delaying consideration of valid appeals.

312

Identifying the truly frivolous appeal is essential yet somewhat metaphysical. 313 The determination necessarily involves some measure of the appellate

306.

FED. R. EVID. 702, 703.

307.

Id. 706 (provides for a specific charge, notice to the parties, discovery, party access and

cross-examination, and guarantees the parties their own experts).

308. As obvious as this might seem, some commentators take seriously the suggestion that
difficult legal issues be referred to outstanding law professors for study and recommendations. See
Nelson, supra note 51, at 46. But see Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 208.
309. The recent trend has not escaped the notice of commentators. See, e.g., Cochran, Trouble
on the Horizon: The Caesload Problem and the "Frivolous Appeal", 2 F'rsH CiR. REP. 249 (1985);
Ginsburg, supra note 1, at 221-22; Martineau, supra note 45; Oberman, supra note 74; Note, Disincentives
to Frivolous Appeals: An Evaluation of an ABA Task Force Proposal, 64 VA. L. REv. 605 (1978).
310. Davies, Gresham's Law Revisited: Expedited Processing Techniques and the Allocation of Appellate
Resources, 6 JusT. Sys. J. 372, 374 (1981).

311. Id. at 374. Professor Davies found that criminal appeals consistently lose to civil appeals
in the competition for appellate court resources. Id. at 373.
312. Martineau, supra note 45, at 847-48. See also Oberman, supra note 74, at 844.
313. "Frivolity, like obscenity, is often difficult to define." WSM, Inc. v. Tennessee Sales
Co., 709 F.2d 1084, 1088 (6th Cir. 1983).
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court's perspective, expectations and receptivity to the issue raised. 314 Various
factors of hopelessness, jurisdictional and substantive, inform the determination.3" 5 Appellate conduct which is dilatory or misleading to an adversary or
to the court should also play a prominent role.3 6 Some courts have vacillated
between subjective and objective standards of frivolity, between an actual bad
faith motivation and a reasonably prudent attorney standard. 7 Other courts
have framed the choice between a negligence standard and an intent standard."'
31 9
Still other courts have been preoccupied only with how the appeal is conducted.
Although the courts have been less than straightforward, the key to understanding the various frivolity standards is determining whether the merit of the
appeal or the motive of the appellant should control.12 0 Whatever the standard,
sanctions may be imposed for frivolous appeals under statute,32 ' rule,3 22 and the
courts' inherent power.

3 23

Monetary sanctions include double CoStS,3 24 damages, attorneys fees, and
fines. 32 The court may assess these sanctions against the attorney or the appellant. Historically, courts have been reluctant to impose such sanctions. Whether
the recent renaissance of monetary sanctions is more than episodic, and whether
it will serve as an effective deterrent, is not yet known. 26 At the very least,

314. Davies, supra note 310, at 375-76.
315. Martineau, supra note 45, at 850-51.
316. Id.
317. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Flaherty, 31 Cal. 3d 637, 649-50, 646 P.2d 179, 186-87, 183
Cal. Rptr. 508, 515-16 (1982) (where a California court discusses the standards applied when
determining whether an appeal is frivolous) (commented on in Forucci, Roland & Stalcup, California
Supreme Court Survey: A Review of Decisions: January 1982 - June 1982, 10 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 167,

174 (1982).
318.

See Comment, Awards of Attorneys' Fees Against Attorneys- Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper,

60 B.U.L. REv. 950, 962-68 (1980).
319. See Martineau, supra note 45, at 856.
320. Id. at 857. See generally Oberman, supra note 74.
321.
28 U.S.C. § 1912 (1982) (courts of appeals have discretion to award the prevailing party
"just damages for his delay, and single or double costs"). See Martineau, supra note 45, at 85758. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1982) (provides, in part, that an attorney "who so multiplies the proceedings
in any case unreasonably and vexatiously" may be ordered "to satisfy personally the excess costs,
expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct"). See also Prossnitz,

Fines Against the Trial Lawyer,
322.

LITIGATION,

Fall 1983, at 36.

FED. R. App. P. 38 (authorizes an award of just damages and single or double costs to

the appellee in frivolous appeals).
323. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). Some courts of
appeals have a local rule on the subject passed under the general authorization of FED. R. App.
P. 47. See 5TH CIR. R. 42; 11TH CIR. R. 18. Additionally, FED. R. App. P. 46 contemplates
sanctions in the courts of appeals' disciplinary authority over attorneys.
324. Single costs or interest payment are authorized in any appeal under FED. R. App. P.

37, 39.
325.
326.

See generally Martineau, supra note 45, at 865-69.
See, e.g., Tatum v. Regents of Nebraska-Lincoln, 103 S. Ct. 3084 (1983) (the Supreme

Court may have delivered an important signal to the courts of appeals when a five-Justice majority
entered a one-sentence order assessing five hundred dollars in damages to a pro se petitioner under
Sup. CT. R. 49.2); United States v. Atkinson, 748 F.2d 659, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (where court
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the present amorphous sources of authority should be consolidated and integrated into a concise framework for analyzing sanction issues. 327 The principal
nonmonetary sanction, of course, is dismissal of the appeal. A truly frivolous
appeal necessarily would be unsuccessful and, thus, dismissal is not truly a
3 28
sanction. The result is the same as if the court heard the appeal and affirmed.
Dismissal, then, should be more widely used, wholly apart from monetary sanctions.
The best analogy for the dismissal of frivolous appeals in the court of appeals
is the Supreme Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction. Not every case which
satisfies the Court's appellate jurisdiction statute receives plenary consideration.3

29

Instead, the appeal must initially raise a "substantial"

federal question

as that nonstatutory requirement has been developed and evolved in Court
decisions. 3 0 However, a proposal for change at the intermediate court need not
be the equivalent of a certiorari jurisdiction. 33' Certiorari jurisdiction is a matter
of discretion with a presumption against exercise. A suggestion for more vigorous dismissal of frivolous appeals would be based on overcoming a presumption of jurisdiction on the appeal as of right. Properly implemented, this
would be more than a half-empty/half-full distinction. The key would be to
articulate a standard for dismissal consistent with the appellate ideal. This articulation does not seem impossible. 33 2 The real problem is that the proposal
resembles the disposition without opinion criticized earlier.3 33 Articulating a
standard that avoids those same dangers to the appellate ideal may be impossible. However, some attempt should be made.
G.

A Postscript

Looking back on federal appellate reforms, both accomplished and proposed,
leaves two impressions. First, a willingness to experiment is important for temporary expediency and for long term improvement. Learned Hand was not
describing this generation of circuit judges when he stated that federal judges
were "curiously timid about innovations.''334 Contemporary courts of appeals

ordered party filing frivolous appeal to pay the government twice the costs the government incurred
in defending the appeal); Reid v. United States, 715 F.2d 1148, 1155 (7th cir. 1983) (where the
court deemed an assessment of double costs for frivolous appeal appropriate). See generally Carrington,

supra note 24, at 569-70; Lumbard, supra note 162, at 38.
327.

Martineau, supra note 45, at 878-85.

328.

Id. at 864.

329. See generally Note, The Supreme Court Dismissal of State Court Appeals for Want of a Substantial
Federal Question, 15 CREIGHTON L. REv. 749, 750 (1982).

330.

R.

STERN

& E.

GRESSMAN,

SUPREME COURT PRACTICE

WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN,

§ 4.28 (5th ed. 1978); 16 C.

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4014 (1977).

331. See infra text accompanying notes 444-57.
332. Others have tried, with mixed success. See Martineau, supra note 45, at 878-85; Oberman,
supra note 74, at 850; Note, supra note 309, at 611-24.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 137-200.
334. Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY
155, 158 (I. Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
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have performed remarkably in the face of docket threat. Second, intramural
reforms have been virtually exhausted in the effort to cope with the caseload.
This pragmatic approach, however, has steered the federal judiciary farther and
farther away from the deliberative, judicial model in the appellate ideal and toward
a bureaucratic model of case processing. Further intramural reforms promise
further slippage. In short, Professor Wright's prescient warning to be wary of
time-saving reforms that may have unanticipated substantive consequences 335 has
gone unheeded.

V.

EXTRAMURAL REFORMS

Significant departures from the appellate ideal and federal traditions have
already occurred. The increase in the caseload has placed a premium on case
management techniques. The courts of appeals have avoided a docket gridlock
by implementing intramural reforms. New internal operating procedures, screening and inventorying, the nonargument calendar, dispositions without opinion,
larger numbers of staff attorneys and law clerks, and administrators with increased responsibilities, have all helped the judges cope. Reforms in place have
contributed nearly all they can. Remaining intramural proposals, with few exceptions, do not promise to make much more of a difference. Yet, the docket
siege continues. Real progress has meant that things are getting worse at a
slower pace.
The remaining types of reform are those termed "extramural" or "structural." Although the distinction between intramural and extramural reforms
may seem a bit metaphysical and subjective, the line may be defended in terms
of separated powers. Intramural reforms are all court-created mechanisms. Extramural reforms require congressional action. In terms of the appellate ideal,
intramural reforms merely change how the courts perform their traditional role.
Extramural reforms consciously and directly change the role itself. While intramural reforms cumulatively redefine the appellate ideal indirectly, extramural
reforms do so individually and directly. That difference is more than an order
of magnitude. Hence, extramural reforms should be viewed as a more serious
threat to the federal appellate tradition. Three extramural reforms have already
been accomplished: (1) adding judges; (2) creating specialized courts; and (3)
circuit splitting. These reforms will be considered separately. In addition, the
discussion will catalogue several structural reforms that are still on the drawing
board.
A.

Adding Judges

If demand for appellate judgepower is not decreased by, for example, requiring only two judges per panel, 336 one other choice is to increase supply.
This can be done without creating new judgeships, by mining existing personnel

335.
336.

Wright, The Federal Courts - A Century After Appomattox, 52 A.B.A. J.
See supra text accompanying notes 279-82.
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resources represented by senior judges, visiting judges, and district judges. Senior judges are those who have retired from regular active service but remain
eligible to sit on a voluntary basis. 3 7 Because they are replaced by active judges,
their services are something of a bonus.3 38 Senior judges are relied on extensively
339
now, however, and do not represent a likely source of additional judgepower.
Visiting judges from other circuits do not increase the overall judge supply but
they have been an important means for matching supply with demand, especially
in the larger, more threatened circuits. 34 This practice serves to diffuse congestion, but it is merely a short term adjustment. 34' Finally, federal district court
judges may sit on panels by special designation.3 42 Again, this device has3 43been
Of
used mostly by the large circuits facing the most severe docket growth.
the three, the latter represents the only long term supply of extra appellate
judgepower. More study and planning would maximize this potential.
A dramatic growth in federal judgeships has occurred at the district court
level. During the 1960's and 1970's their ranks increased more than 100 percent
in absolute numbers. 34 Additionally, the number of support personnel increased
substantially. Reliance on what Judge Edwards calls special "subjudges" masters, magistrates, and bankruptcy judges - has increased the supply of
3 45
non-article III decisionmakers as well as their responsibilities.
Two points concerning these trial court developments are significant. First,
growth at the intake court of original jurisdiction necessarily places pressure on
the appellate function. Second, the solution of "subjudges" has been rejected
for the courts of appeals, and properly so. 34 Permanent adjuncts are not desirable in a court of error with important law making functions. Limited use
of senior judges, visiting judges and district judges is preferred.3 47 But, in the
long run, appeals ought to be decided by permanent, active circuit judges as
much as possible.3 48 Decision in this manner helps ensure one law of the court
supported by a majority of its judges.
337.

28 U.S.C. § 294 (1982).

338.
339.

See Carrington, supra note 24, at 563-64.
But see Lumbard, supra note 162, at 33. Proposals to require retirement to increase the

number of senior judges available for service raise no small constitutional problem. See Major, Why
Not Mandatoy Retirment for FederalJudges?, 52 A.B.A. J. 29 (1966).
340. See Carrington, supra note 24, at 564.
341. See id. at 564-65.
342. 28 U.S.C. § 292-293, 295 (Supp. 1985).
343. See Carrington, supra note 24, at 565.
344. Id. See also Clark, supra note 212, at 71. Relatively, an 83 percent increase in federal
trial judges per million population has occurred since the turn of the century. Id.
345. Clark, supra note 212, at 144-45; Edwards, supra note 6, at 879-80.
346. One noteworthy recent exception has arisen. Bankruptcy appellate panels, consisting of
three bankruptcy judges, can hear appeals from the Bankruptcy Court before a second appeal to
the court of appeals. 28 U.S.C. 5 158 (1984 Supp.) See Deane & Tehan, supra note 254, at 1617.
347. See Meador, supra note 37, at 647-48. Some critics, as we have seen, have expressed a
concern lest staff attorneys and law clerks evolve into "subjudges." See supra text accompanying
notes 212-38.
348.

Lumbard, supra note 162, at 33.
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Adding judges has already changed the federal appellate structure, and continuing Congress' ad hoc approach will exacerbate the problems of growth.
349
During their first decade, the courts of appeals were assigned thirty judgeships;
35 0
today one hundred and sixty-eight judgeships exist.
The congressional palliative for the recent caseload growth has been adding judges. Although this
rate eclipsed general population growth by a wide margin, 35 ' added judgeships
still did not keep pace with filings.35 2 The single most notable legislative response
was to add judges in fits and spurts. Between 1975 and 1982 the number of
35 3
court of appeals judges grew from ninety-seven to one hundred thirty-two.
Thirty-five judgeships were added in 1978354 and another twenty-five in 1984.351
This resulted in some very large courts. The Ninth Circuit now has twentyeight authorized judgeships, 3 6 and only the First Circuit has fewer than nine
members, 357 once thought the maximum.3 8 The turn of the century certainty
of precedent, when the same three judges decided each case, has been lost due
to the present thousands of permutations of panel membership. Conflicts are
inevitable. Monitoring the law is nearly impossible. The traditional unifying
35 9
function of the en banc court has become unwieldly due to size.
Over the course of this growth, the internal structure of relationships of
judge to judge, panel to panel, and panel to en banc court has become so
complex that it cannot be said to be the same appellate system as before the
additions. Worse still is that the additional judgeships have not achieved any
lasting improvement. Detailed study of each large increase in the number of
judges discloses a sharp impact on the appeals per panel ratio which lasts only
one year. 36 0 The major benefit of adding judges seems to be this temporary
braking effect. 36 '
The corresponding costs seem very high. As Judge Edwards has remarked,
the government's ability to attract and retain capable judges is, at least in part,

349. Carrington, supra note 24, at 580 n.165.
350. 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (1984 Supp.).
351.
For example, in 1937 122,000,000 people were served by 46 court of appeals judges. By
1980 the numbers were 266,000,000 and 132. Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 10 (citing an address
by W. Rehnquist, Mac Swinford Lecture at the University of Kentucky (Sept. 23, 1982)).
352. For example, between 1960 and 1980 filings in the courts of appeals increased a staggering
419 percent. Meador, supra note 37, at 618. See generally Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 6.
353. Wald, supra note 29, at 775 n.26.
354. Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1269.
355. Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 346.
356. Id. The Fifth Circuit had 26 judges before its division. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994. See generally Baker, supra note 7
357. Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 346.
358. See infra text accompanying notes 374-85.
359. See generally Baker, A Postscript on Precedent in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 36 Sw. L.J. 725,
727-29 (1982).
360. W. McLAUCHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 107 (1984).
361.
"The increase in judges only delayed what appears to be a nearly inexorable climb in
appeals taken to the courts of appeals." Id.
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inversely proportional to the size of the federal judiciary.3 62 Part of the prestige
of the judgeships on the courts of appeals has been their relative scarcity. Until
this generation, the authorized number of lifetime appointments was fewer than
the number of Senators. The concern is not that a judgeship would go begging
but that lowered perceptions would attract lesser judges. Of course, this has
not happened yet, but the concern is often voiced and, more often than not,
by the judges themselves.
Pay scale and work conditions are also part of the picture. Higher private
sector salaries and negative perceptions of the appellate treadmill can influence
highly qualified candidates to decline to serve.3 63 A more immediate concern is
the threat to coherence and uniformity in the law.3 64 Ignoring the intangible
loss of collegiality, the instability of the law grows geometrically with the addition
of judges. Not just an evil in itself, instability also increases the workload as
more panel rehearings and en banc courts are required, and the uncertainty
3 65
of outcomes becomes an incentive generating more appeals.

362. Edwards, supra note 6, at 918.
363. Compensation of judges has gained much attention. See generally Slack, Commentary Funding the FederalJudiciay, 82 W. VA. L. REy. 1 (1979); Sprecher, The Threat to Judicial Independence,
51 IND. L.J. 380 (1976); Note, Compensation of the Federal Judiciary: A Reexamination, 8 U. MICH.

J.L.

REF.

595 (1975).

On the other hand, the monetary cost of an additional properly-paid judgeship and staff represents
an almost inconsequential sum in the national budget. See P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 199.
364. See P. CARRINOTON, supra note 14, at 199-200. Former Attorney General Smith recently
expressed the concern that "[i]ncreasing the number of decisionmakers issuing opinions threatens
uniformity, evenhandedness, and stability in the application of the law." Smith, The Role of the
Federal Courts, CAsE & COM., Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 12 (1983).
365. Edwards, supra note 6, at 918-19; Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 10-11. Judge Tjoflat of
the Eleventh Circuit recently explained:
One of the biggest problems facing the federal judiciary is the instability of the rule
of law that results when we create great numbers of additional judgeships. The more judges
we create at the appellate level, the larger we make courts of appeals, the more unstable
the law becomes. If you have three judges on a court of appeals, the law is stable. It is
stable for litigants, lawyers, and district judges. The outcome of a suit, should one be
filed, is predictble. When you add the fourth judge to that court, you add some instability
to the rule of law in that circuit because another point of view is added to the decisionmaking. When you add the fifth judge, the sixth judge, when you get as large as the old
Fifth Circuit was, with twenty-six judges, the law becomes extremely unstable. One of
several thousand different panel combinations will decide the case, will interpret the law.
Even if the court has a rule, as we did in the old Fifth, ,that one panel cannot overrule
another, a court of twenty-six will still produce irreconcilable statements of the law.
This tremendous potential for instability in the rule of law creates a great deal of
litigation. So you have a situation where you add judges to dispose of more cases, and
at the court of appeals level, at least, the new judges may well cause more litigation than
they can terminate.
If we are to save for tomorrow the system of justice the framers gave us, we must be
ever mindful of this problem.
Interview with Judge Gerald Bard Tjoflat, reprinted in THIRD BRANCH, Apr., 1983, at 1, 3-4.
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The problem is not with numbers, but with priorities. Increasing the number
of judgeships ought to be a reform of last resort. 366 The unintended effects of
such a "quick fix" are demonstrated by the unalterable change in the basic
structure of the courts of appeals. 367 To go on simply adding judges is itself a
deceptively simple solution with serious consequences. The important issues
become how to determine when an increase is necessary and whether some
diseconomy of scale suggests a point beyond which the system cannot go without
utterly destroying the appellate function.
The current methodology for determining when to add new judgeships is
surprisingly uncomplicated. The Judicial Conference surveys the judgepower
needs of federal courts every four years and makes recommendations to Congress. After that, the political process operates like a black box to create judgeships.168 The addition of permanent article III positions should always be a
matter for serious study. A multi-faceted analysis of need should be developed. 369
A 1981 Federal Judicial Center Study considered the failings of the present
approach and offered a reform. 70 Admitting the difficulty of assessing judgeship
need, the study still faulted the present system. 7 ' First, the time lag between
identified need and creation renders the new position less effective. Second,
legislative litters of judges cause severe assimilation problems in terms of confirmation, orientation, staff, and office space. 372 Third, the present system has
increased dependence on a judgepower strategy to the exclusion of other methods
of coping with caseloads.
The narrow emphasis on judgeship creation has been the result of a felt
need to have sufficient judgepower to handle case filings. 3 3 In terms of the
appellate ideal, the optimum number of federal judgeships should be determined by the concept of role fashioned for federal courts.3 74 Federalism defines that role vis-a-vis state courts. Assessments of federal judgeship needs
ultimately must address the present imbalance that allows what are essentially
state claims into the federal system. 37 5 Clearly, Congress must make this ad-

366. See Higginbotham, supra note 36, at 270.
367. Id. at 271.
368. The judicial needs of the country do not always play a controlling or even prominent
role in the political process. For example, Congress allowed the needs to build until the Democrats
recaptured the White House and then raised the appellate positions from 97 to 132 in 1978. J.
HOWARD, supra note 31, at 270.
369. See generally TASK FORCE ON PRINCIPLES FOR ASSESSING THE ADEQUACY OF JUDICIAL RESOURCES, AssESsING THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL RESOURCES -

GUIDELINES FOR A NEW PROCESS (Nat'l

Center for State Courts Preliminary Draft 1983) (discussing state trial courts of general jurisdiction).
370.

371.
372.
be paced
373.
purpose."
374.
375.

C. BAAR, JUDOESHIP CREATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: OPTIONS FOR REFORM (1981).

Id. at 2-4.
A broader policy question is whether the executive's impact on the federal judiciary should
along presidencies. Id. at 3.
Congress has "neglect[ed] important considerations of organizational dynamics and judicial
Id. at 46.
Id. at 47.
This situation may be termed the "in-out" principle. Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at
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279

justment.3 76 Moving from the long range position to the short range, the Federal
Judicial Center Study made creative recommendations for overcoming the inadequacies of the present political black box:
1. Authority to create federal court judgeships should be delegated
to the Judicial Conference of the United States.

2. The Judicial Conference should develop explicit and public procedures for the exercise of this new authority.

3. Judgeship creation should be limited to no more than eight additional positions per year.

4. The Judicial Conference should have authority to shift judgeships
from one district or circuit to another, by ruling that the next vacancy
in a designated district or circuit not be filled.

5. No additional judgeships should be created in a year in which
overall federal case filings have declined, provided that judgeships can
be shifted as proposed in item 4.

6. Congress can veto in whole or in part the actions taken by the
Judicial Conference under the authority conferred above, by simple ressubmission of its recolution passed within ninety days of Conference
3 77
ommendations to the House and Senate.
This reform has difficulties, but it represents a profound improvement over the
3 78
ad hoc process now in place.
A final issue on judgeship creation is whether, going beyond a filings per
judge focus, an institutional limit exists on the number of appellate judges
beyond which stability and coherence are not possible. As a matter of philosophy, Justice Frankfurter recognized that federal judgeships could not be con-

81-82. See also Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668, 679-80 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).

376. Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 85-87. the difficult task remains to articulate some meaningful standards of what disputes require an article III decisionmaker and reviewer.
377. C. BARR, supra note 370, at 48.
378. See generally Kastenmeier & Remington, Court Reform and Access to Justice: A Legislative
Perspective, 16 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 301 (1979); Mikva, More Judgeships - But Not All at Once, 39
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 23 (1982).
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sidered a limitless resource.3 7 9 At some point, the courts of appeals would become
a "Tower of Babel" with too many circuits and too many judges to pursue
effectively their appellate ideal and system function."""
The problem is to establish a specific maximum effective size of a court
sitting in panels that can operate as a single administrative unit.38 A committee
of the Judicial Conference selected the number nine, deus ex machina, in 1964
and announced that no court of appeals could be expected to stay efficient and
unified if the active judgeships exceeded that number.3 2 As noted earlier, that
limit has long since been overrun.38 3 Nonetheless, the experts agree that a limit
3

should exist.

4

1

Until now, practical necessity has overcome this principle with each enlargement of the federal appellate courts.38 5 Recently, the advocacy of limits
has enjoyed a renaissance.38 6 The shared perception is that at some point large
courts stop resembling courts under the appellate ideal and begin to function
as administrative agencies or, worse, legislatures. Judge Posner has suggested
a moratorium on the creation of district court judgeships.3 7 Because the trial
courts are operating near capacity and the courts of appeals are roughly keeping
pace, his solution would suspend appellate docket growth.3 8 The consequent
queuing at the trial level might force the type of system overhaul federal ju38 9
risdiction sorely needs.

379. The consequences that [the expanding federal caseload] entails for the whole federal judicial
system... cannot be met by a steady increase in the number of federal judges ....
The
function and role of the federal courts and the nature of their judicial process involve
impalpable factors, subtle but far reaching, which cannot be satisfied by enlarging the
judicial plant ....
In the farthest reaches of the problem a steady increase in judges does
not alleviate; in my judgment, it is bound to depreciate the quality of the federal judiciary
and thereby adversely to affect the whole system.
Lumbermen's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 58-59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See also H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 44-46 (1973); Bork, Dealing with
the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 234 (1976).
380. See Meador, supra note 37. at 642.
381.
Carrington, supra note 24, at 584 n.189. See also supra text accompanying notes 249-51.

382.

1964

ANNUAL

REPORT JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES

15. The Committee

provided little elaboration, and the limit was overrun quickly. See 1967 REPORT OF
OF THE JUDICIAL

CONFERENCE OF

THE UNITED

STATES

THE

PROCEEDINGS

9 (recommendation for 13 and 15 judges

respectively for the Ninth and Fifth Circuits).
383. See supra text accompanying notes 349-59.
384. "For the courts of appeals the view is widespread that there comes a point when the
number of judges is so large that the court cannot function effectively as a collegial body." C.
WRICHT, supra note 45, § 3510, at 33.
385. See Wright, supra note 74, at 968.
386. See Burdick, supra note 59, at 808-10; McCree, supra note 43, at 782.
387. "[Tlhere is general recognition today that there is a natural limit on the number of
federal court of appeals judges and that we are either near, or already have exceeded, that limit
Posner, supra note 37, at 762.
388. Id at 765-67. See also W. McLAUCHLAN, supra note 360, at 109.
389. See generally Hill & Baker, supra note 68.
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B.

Specialized Appellate Courts

The subject of specialized courts is, at once, divisive and rather boring.
Little remains to be said in a general way. However, one rather provocative
recent proposal deserves mention.
Specialized appellate courts have been a part of the federal system for a
long time and their number has recently increased. Since 1950 the United States
Court of Military Appeals has had appellate jurisdiction over the military justice
system .3 " The Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of all the district courts in the energy field. 39' In 1981
Congress established the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
and reassigned the nationwide appellate jurisdiction of the eliminated Court of
Claims and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.3 92 There are not more such
courts because the creation of specialized courts has been consistently disfavored.3 9 3 Further specialized courts have been suggested, often depending on
the proponent's like or dislike for the subject area, in tax law,3g4 administrative
law,

395

3 96
and criminal law.

Court specialization Alds the promise of deepening expertise, uniformity
and stability, as judges become experienced and encounter the full dimension
of their subject matter. Proposals for specialized courts have been rejected for
several reasons: (1) specialized judges develop too narrow a perspective; (2) a
stratified bar would develop with specialist attorneys having peculiar relationships with their bench; (3) balkanized procedural rules would develop and substantive principles would evolve in a sheltered environment; (4) a narrower
subject matter jurisdiction would open the possibility that special interests would
have undue influence on the area of the law; and (5) limiting jurisdiction would
limit prestige and attract less able judges. 397 Specialization simply threatens

390.

10 U.S.C. S 867 (1982). See generally Willis, The United States Court of Military Appeals -

"Born Again", 52

IND.

L.J. 151 (1976).

391. 15 U.S.C. § 754(a)(1) (1982). A similar tribunal handled price control cases during World
War II. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). See generally Elkins, The Temporary Emergency
Court of Appeals: A Study in the Abdication of Judicial Responsibility, 1978 DUKE L.J. 113.
392.

Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25. See generally Petrowitz, Federal

Court Refonn: The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 -

And Be ond, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 543

(1983).
393. E.g., P. CARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 167-84; J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 284-86;
R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 41-42, 70-71 (1976); Higginbotham, supra note 36, at 268; Lumbard, supra note 162, at 34-35.
394. Griswold, supra note 10, at 806-07; Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57
HARV. L. REv. 1153 (1944).

395. Bork, supra note 379; Cooper, The Proposed United States Administrative Court (pts. 1 & 2),
35 MICH. L. REv. 193 (1936), 35 MICH. L. Rav. 535 (1937). The District of Columbia Circuit has
come dose to being a de facto specialized court for administrative agency review. See also Posner,supra
note 37, at 789-90.
396. Haynsworth, supra note 67, at 604-07.
397. Overton, A Prescriptionfor the Appellate Caseload Explosion, 12 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 205,

221-22 (1984).
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the generalist assumptions of the common law order.39 s
Professor Meador has proposed a compromise which seems to offer the
benefits of a specialized court while minimizing the disadvantages. 99 His approach calls for selected assignment of appeals by subject matter to designated
court divisions. Each court of appeals would be divided into relatively permanent
administrative divisions. For example, a twenty-member court might consist of
four divisions each with five judges who would sit in panels of three. Each
division would be assigned several categories of law. For example, division one
might be assigned antitrust and securities cases. The divisions must be relatively
permanent to assure continuity and avoid stagnation. One judge in each division
might rotate to another division each year. Meador's proposal is an obvious
effort to compromise between the generalist status quo and the feared specialist
system. The proposal merits close consideration as a possible structural reform
by Congress.400 It just might work.?"
C.

Circuit Splitting

The present circuit boundaries are quite arbitrary, the product of historical
accident. 402 Since the court of appeals system was created in 1891, two splits

398. One commentator summed-up the worries for specialized courts:
[A] body of law, secluded from the rest, develops a jargon of its own, thought-patterns
that are unique, internal policies which it subserves and which are different from and
sometimes at odds with the policies pursued by the general law.
One you complete the circle of specialization by having a specialized court as well as
a specialized Bar, then you have set aside a body of wisdom that is the exclusive possession
of a very small group of men who take their purposes for granted. Very soon their internal
language becomes so highly stylized as to be unintelligible to the uninitiated. That in turn
intensifies the seclusiveness of that branch of the law and that further immunizes it against
the refreshment of new ideas, 3uggestions, adjustments and compromises which constitute
the very tissue of any living system of law. In time, like a primitive priest-craft, content
with its vested privileges, it ceases to proselytize, to win converts to its cause, to persuade
laymen of the social values that it defends. Such a development is invariably a cause of
decadence and decay.
Rifkind, A Special Court for Patent Litigation? The Danger of a Specialized Judiczary, 37 A.B.A. J. 425,
425-26 (1951).
399. See P. CARRINTON, supra note 14, at 174-84; Meador, supra note 37, at 645-47; Meador,
supra note 74, at 282-85. See generally Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution Through
Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 471 (1983).
400. But cf. Meador, supra note 37, at 646 (suggesting either a judicial or a legislative implementation).
401.
The proposal is modeled after a fully operational West German system. See Meador,
Appellate Subject Matter Organization: The German Design From an American Experience, 5 HASTINGS INr'L
& CoMp. L. REv. 27 (1981). Another application might involve assigning diversity appeals to
standing panels of judges familiar with a particular state's substantive law. Now in the Fifth Circuit
a Texas law decision may be reviewed by three judges from Louisiana. Even in courts of appeals
with fewer than three judges from one state, the out of state judges assigned in this way would
develop some expertise during their assignment.
402. Baker, supra note 7, at 736-39 (chronological table).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol37/iss2/2

58

Baker: A Compendium of Proposals to Reform the United States Courts of A

1985]

PROPOSALS TO REFORM UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

have occurred: The Eighth Circuit was redefined into the Eighth and Tenth
Circuits in 1929, and the Fifth Circuit was redefined into the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits in 1981.40 For a time circuit splitting, dividing the largest courts 0of4
appeals into two or three new courts, was a commonly mentioned solution.
The problems of the large court, to which splitting is offered as a solution, are
chiefly the result of simple-mindedly adding judgeships to meet a rising caseload. 40 - At some point, even Congress must realize that the addition of judges
4 6°
decreases the overall effectiveness of the judicial system.
There is a predictable downside to splitting circuits. The more courts of
appeals, the higher the likelihood of intercircuit conflicts. Furthermore, splitting
irreversibly dilutes the "federalizing function of courts of appeals.

'

4

0

7

The fewer

states the circuit includes, the less national the court becomes. Of course, everyone agrees that adding judges and dividing courts is a limited strategy.40 8 Perhaps the most important argument against splitting existing circuits is that the
reform does not work. Some large circuits which might need splitting, like the
40 9
District of Columbia, Second, and Ninth Circuits, are practically indivisible.
The division of the former Fifth Circuit did not work any miracle. The new
4 0
Fifth Circuit is back to its pre-division statistical crisis level in terms of filings.
The Ninth Circuit, which escaped the 1981 axe is doing well enough to continue
41
to resist division. '

Rather than splitting existing circuits, the entire geographical scheme could
be redrawn 42 Such a strategy has its difficulties. Judge Rubin woul, tlive to-.

403. See generally Baker, supra note 359 (discussion of Congress' division of the former Fifth
Circuit into the new Fifth and Eleventh Circuits); Baker, A Pimer on Precedent in the Eleventh Circuit,
34 MERCEP. L. REv. 1175 (1983) (same); Baker, supra note 7 (same).

404. See generally Burdick, supra note 59,r at 810-12 (discussing the policy behind splitting the
Fifth and Ninth Circuits); McGree, supra note 43, at 784-85 (same).
405. The problems of adding judges are described above. See supra text accompanying notes
337-89.
406. "Congress recognize[s] that a point is reached where the addition of judges decreases the
effectiveness of the court, complicates the administration of uniform law, and potentially diminishes
the quality of justice within a circuit." Heflin, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980
Overdue Relieffor an Overworked Court, 11 Cum. L. REv. 597, 616 (1980-81) (citation omitted).
407. Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 Loy. L. REv. 787, 788 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
See also Wright, supra note 74, at 974.
408. "[A]re we to continue the splitting process until it becomes mincing, with a United States
Court of Appeals for the Houston Metropolitan Area?" Gee, The Imminent Destruction of the Ffih
Circuit; Or, How Not to Deal with a Blossoming Docket, 9 TEx. TECH. L. Rav. 799, 806 (1978).
409. Carrington, supra note 24, at 587 (discussing how some circuits are not amenable to
division); Hellman, Legal Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal Judicial Circuits, 122 U. P,. L.
Rrv. 1188 (1974) (same).
410. Speech by Gilbert Ganucheau, Fifth Circuit Appellate Advocacy Seminar (Oct. 18, 1984),
reprinted in 2 Fivrrm Cip. REP. 301 (1985). See also supra note 356 (despite division of the Fifth
Circuit, filings continue to be heavy in the Fifth and Eleventh circuits).
411. Frank, Split 9th Circuit?, 71 A.B.A. J. 30 (985), See also supra note 255.
412. The Hruska Commission targeted the Fifth and the Ninth Circuits for splitting rather
than produce the unsettling effects of nationwide reorganization. Baker, supra note 8, at 698 n.91.
See supra text accompanying notes 93-100.
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equalize size and workload by creating approximately twenty circuitsa 3 Judge
Wallace would consolidate the courts of appeals and dramatically reduce their
number.4 14 Neither approach directly addresses the real problem. Redrawing
circuit boundaries, by itself, is not worth the effort. More circuits would increase
the likelihood of intercircuit conflicts. Fewer circuits would increase the likelihood of intracircuit conflicts. Circuit splitting must therefore be dismissed as
a red-herring, the result of Congress' linear strategy of adding judges.
D.

Proposed Structural Reforms

Several structural reforms have been proposed. Some have been on the
drawing board a long time, while others are more recent. Five proposals are
of particular interest: (1) reducing original federal jurisdiction; (2) instituting
alternative dispute resolution; (3) creating a new intermediate court; (4) granting
the courts of appeals discretionary control of their dockets; and (5) consolidating
the present intermediate tier into one court. The first two proposals might be
grouped together as remedies for the entire federal judicial institution, but their
impact on the middle tier would be great. The last three proposals directly
relate to the courts of appeals and their particular crises.
1.

Reducing Original Jurisdiction

The most far-reaching proposal for dealing with the courts of appeals' dockets
does not directly concern appellate jurisdiction. A profound reduction in the
scope of the original jurisdiction in the district courts would have a radical,
albeit derivative, impact on the error correction and lawmaking functions of
the courts of appeals. Hence, such proposals are properly considered here.
More than a decade ago then Second Circuit Chief Judge Friendly penned
a remarkable book which so far remains this generation's seminal work on
reducing and rationalizing the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 4 5 All his recommendations cannot be considered in so small a space as this. Chief Judge
Friendly's themes, however, bear directly on the thesis here and merit repeating.
Disciples of his philosophy call on Congress to redefine federal court jurisdiction
so that the courts can better perform their constitutional mandate. 4'1 6 This task

413. Rubin, supra note 291, at 459.
414. Wallace, supra note 90, at 940-41.
415. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973) (based on Chief Judge
Friendly's celebrated Carpentier Lectures at Columbia Law School). Se generally AMERICAN LAw INST.,
supra note 80; supra text accompanying notes 79-84. The subsequent literary reaction was substantial.
E.g., Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 634 (1974); Moroney,
Averting the Flood: Henry J. Friendly and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts - Part I, 27 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 1071 (1976).

416. Rubin, supra note 47, at 657. See also Edwards, supra note 6, at 922 (advocating that
federal courts concentrate jurisdiction resources to art. III claims); Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 15
(same); Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 81-85; McCree, supra note 43, at 794 (same). The approach
is related to the earlier discussed proposal for ranking priority appeals. See supra text accompanying

notes 246-47.
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is uniquely political.4 1 7 Congress must first preserve the constitutional value of
redress for those claims and claimants which present the raison d'etre for the

courts of the third article. Second, public policy obliges Congress to ration
remaining resources for cases that serve important non-constitutional national
interests.

Descending to a lower level of abstraction discloses three difficulties with
these lofty sentiments.4 1 First, during the last two "crisis" decades, the number
of appeals has risen significantly higher than the number of cases filed in the
district courts. 41 9 Only a very large cutback on original jurisdiction will achieve

significant appellate reductions. Second, consensus is lacking on which areas to
target for change. The elimination of diversity jurisdiction, an obvious yet controverted solution, 420 would relieve approximately one-fourth of the district courts'
dockets and one-tenth of the courts of appeals' dockets. 42' Third, congressional

momentum is flowing in the opposite direction. Today, access to federal courts
is easier than ever before. 422 Congress has recently encroached on traditional

state law domains with neither rhyme nor reason.4 23 A Jurisdictional Review
and Revision Commission should be created to study the federal judicial system
4 24
and recommend to Congress lasting structual reforms in jurisdiction.
2.

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Related to Chief Judge Friendly's reallocation of disputes to the state courts,
the theme of reallocating disputes out of the court system altogether has garnered

417. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 922-24.
418. See Haworth, supra note 10, at 261.
419. Id. (statistics).
420. "Caveat lector! I am a notorious diversity abolitionist." Baker, Federal Jurisdiction, 16 TEX.
TECH. L. REv. 145, 164 (1985). But see Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 403 (1979); Marsh, Diversity Jurisdiction: Scapegoat of Overcrowded Federal Courts, 48 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 197 (1982).

421. Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction, 1982: Hearing on H.R. 6691 Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
95-96 (1982) (statistics for year ending June 30, 1980). See also Griswold, supra note 10, at 796
(provides estimates of relief for federal courts' dockets by eliminating diversity jurisdiction).
422. See Haworth, supra note 10, at 261.
423. Justice Rehnquist lists several examples of this phenomenon: The Federal Child Support
Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. 5S 651-665 (1982); the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §5 1601-1667c
(1982); the Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, 15 U.S.C. 5 1901-2012 (1982).
Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 8-9. Instead, Congress inexplicably proposes to preserve diversity jurisdiction while seriously limiting civil rights jurisdiction and eliminating general federal question
jurisdiction. See Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 14; McGowan, Federalism - Old and New - And the
Federal Courts, 70 GEo. L.J. 1421 (1982). See generally Weinstein, Coordination of State and Federal
JudicialSystems, 57 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 1 (1982) (discussion of encroachment into areas of traditional

state concern).
424. In 1980 such a proposal was introduced. S. 3123, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). See 126
CONO. REC. 25,747-48 (1980) (text of bill and remarks of Sen. Thurmond). See generally Burger,
Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 446 (1983) (discussion of needed
congressional study of jurisdictional reform for federal courts); Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 85-

87 (same).
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much recent attention. The idea is to provide out-of-court resolution of otherwise
4 25
federal controversies by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and settlements.
The impact here would also be felt most directly at the trial level and only
derivatively at the middle tier. Because at present these methods are not widely
used, they hold a potential for caseload relief that some find attractive. Judge
Edwards, a recent convert, suggests that if the caseload and coping mechanisms
threaten the federal appellate ideal, then an emphasis on alternative dispute
resolution would preserve substantive rights and enhance the quality of judicial
determinations.

426

Alternative dispute resolution methods are rarely used on the federal level
for three reasons. First, a widespread perception considers a judicial determination superior to any alternative. 427 Second, the bar has been slow to embrace
these alternatives although market forces seem to be moving attorneys and
clients away from a litigious mindset as litigation becomes more costly in terms
of expenses and delays. 42 1 Third, any such change would require the active
commitment of the federal government because of its active role in the appellate
process.

42 9

Whatever the intensity of the first two factors, the third factor appears to
be in a state of flux. Recent congressional proposals go far toward recognizing
that "[a]ccess to an appropriate forum does not always require a public hearing
before a life-tenured judge operating under formal rules of evidence and procedure. ' 430 There is a profound need for standards for making the decision
about allocating disputes, however. 431 Certainly, the most important issues of
constitutional rights belong before an article III judge. On the secondary policy
level, however, such considerations as probability of error, the need for finality,
the cost/benefit ratio, public demand, and user satisfaction all affect the political
4 12

allocation.

See generally Bork, Dealing with the Overload in Article III Courts, in POUND CONFERENCE,
ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 150 (A. Levin & R. Wheeler eds. 1979) (discussion of
alternative out-of-court dispute resolution mechanisms); A. LIND & J. SHEPARD, EVALUATION OF
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1981); Harter, Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. (1982); Nejelski & Zeldin, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the
Federal Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REV. 787 (1983); Rosenberg, Devising Procedures that
Are Civil to Promote Justice that Is Civilized, 69 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1971).
426. Edwards, supra note 6, at 929.
427. Id. at 927.
428. Ginsburg, supra note 66, at 19. See also supra text accompanying notes 290-95.
429. Wald, supra note 29, at 774. The United States is a party in more than one-third of the
civil
cases on the district courts' dockets. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 22, at 113
(4th ed. 1983).
430. Bell, Crisis in the Courts: Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 3, 7 (1978). See also Note,
Realigning the Federal Court Caseload, 12 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1001, 1009-12 (1979). Cf. FED. R. Ctv.
P. 16(c)(7) (1983) (subjects to be discussed at pretrial conference include "the use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute").
431. See generally Sarat, supra note 51.
432. Id. at 307-08.
425.

PERSPECTIVES
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Alternative dispute resolution holds the promise for a long-term reduction
in demand for federal judicial resources. It may also allow for improved proc433
essing of some routine, fact-specific grievances presently before federal courts.
If implemented, these proposals could have a significant effect on the structure
of our federal courts system.
3.

A New Intermediate Court

Creating a new intermediate court is not a new idea. 434 Rather than discuss
the multitude of proposals to expand the vertical structure of the federal courts
by creating a national court of appeals between the present courts of appeals
and the Supreme Court, this section will focus on Chief Justice Burger's recent
proposal.4 3 5 His proposal may be traced back to the Freund Commission and
Hruska Commission plans. However, it contains important refinements4 36 that
give it an excellent chance of passage. The Chief Justice first endorsed the
specific recommendation in February 1983. 43 7 For the first time since such proposals have been considered, subcommittees in both the House and Senate
favorably reported bills based on the plan out to their full judiciary committees.438 Presently, the Chief Justice's plan calls for creation of a temporary and
experimental panel-the Intercircuit Panel-composed of court of appeals judges
selected by the Supreme Court. 439 One judge would be selected from each of
the courts of appeals, creating a panel of nine with four alternates. 440 Cases
would continue to move from the courts of appeals to the Supreme Court, but
the Supreme Court would have discretion to refer cases to the Intercircuit Panel
for final national resolution of conflicts and decision of significant federal questions subject to subsequent Supreme Court review.441
Understandably, most of the debate has centered on whether this proposal
would meaningfully relieve the Supreme Court. 442 However, those arguments

433. Edwards, supra note 6, at 936.
434. "In connection with currently discussed plans for reform of the Federal judiciary, consideration might well be given to the proposal to create a National Court of Appeals, intermediate
between the Supreme Court of the United States and the several circuit courts of appeals." Dumbauld, A National Court of Appeals, 29 GEO. L.J. 461 (1941) (citation omitted).
435. A separate category of proposals would create a new national court to review state court
decisions, both civil and criminal. Cameron, Federal Review, Finality of State Court Decisions, and a
Proposalfor a National Court of Appeals - A State Judge's Solution to a Continuing Problem, 1981 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 545, 555-60.
436. See generally Note, supra note 6, at 1310-17.
437. Burger, supra note 436, at 443-44.
438. Hellman, The Proposed Intercircuit Tribunal: Do We Need It? Will It Work?, 11 HAsTINOS
CONST. L.Q. 375, 377-78 (1984); ChiefJustice Renews Proposalfor a National Intercircuit Panel, THIRD
BRANCH, Mar, 1985, at 9.
439. Burger, The Time Is Now for the Intercircuit Panel, 71 A.B.A. J. 86, 88 (1985). See also S.
704, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (Apr. 1985).
440. The alternates would sit for two two-week sessions each year. Burger, supra note 439, at
88.
441. Id.
442. E.g., Alsup & Salisbury, A Comment on Chief Justice Burger's Proposalfor a Temporary Panel
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will not be rehearsed here. Considering the Chief Justice's proposal from the
viewpoint of the courts of appeals, the experiment risks little and affords great
promise. Additional appellate capacity could be used to reduce conflicts and
achieve more national uniformity more quickly. In performing the lawmaking
function, the Intercircuit Panel would represent a return to the original judicial
plan, in which the courts of appeals perform the error correction function. The
strongest argument for Chief Justice Burger's plan is his own candid admission
that he does not know whether it will work. He has proposed a five-year
"sunset" provision. If the Intercircuit Panel withstands an actual test, it can
be renewed. If it proves a failure the plan can be abandoned; even before the
five-year period has elapsed, the Supreme Court could stop referring cases. The
Chief Justice's plan should be viewed as a temporary measure. Ultimately a
basic restructuring of the intermediate tier is needed, but such a restructuring
44
does not appear to be immediately forthcoming. '
4.

Discretionary Courts of Appeals

In a recent speech criticizing the cost and delay in our federal courts, Justice
Rehnquist proposed that the basic assumption of the appeal as of right be
reconsidered.4 44 His solution would allow review only when granted in the discretion of a panel of the court of appeals. 44 5 Of course, such a proposal assumes
the right to an appeal is not a matter of due process. 446 Some analogies may
be seen in present practice, beyond such appellate doctrines as plain error and
sufficiency of evidence review. Leave to appeal is a feature of the current federal
procedures for interlocutory appeals 447 and prisoner petitions. 44 Rehearings and
4 49
rehearings en banc are committed to the petitioned court's discretion.
The basic problem with discretion being the rule is the effect such a structural reform would have on the federal appellate ideal. The original design, in

to Resolve Intercircuit Conflicts, 11 HASrINGS CONST. L.Q. 359 (1984). While the Chief Justice would
have the Supreme Court go back to the good old days of hearing 100 cases instead of the present
150, Justice Rehnquist does not agree. See Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 6.
443. See generally Thompson, Increasing Uniformity and Capacity in the Federal Appellate System, 11
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 457, 487-504 (1984). See also infra text accompanying notes 458-81.
444. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1984, at 27, col. I (quoted in Martineau, supra note 45, at 846
n.5).
445. Id. This again is not a new idea. In 1941 Roscoe Pound suggested that trial judges be
arranged in divisions for review of single-judge decisions with appeals being at the discretion of
the court of appeals. R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 390 (1941) (quoted in
Newbern & Wilson, Rule 21: Unprecedent and the Disappearing Court, 32 ARK. L. REX. 37, 56-57
(1978)). See also Haworth, supra note 10, at 321-26 (proposal to create a new appellate division
between district court and court of appeals with discretionary review in the latter).
446. Rubin, supra note 291, at 460 n.43. If venerable Supreme Court dicta is accurate, no
federal constitutional right to appeal exists even in criminal cases. E.g., Jones v. Barnes, 436 U.S.
745, 749 (1983); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 688 (1894). See generally Carrington, supra
note 24, at 574-79.
447. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1964) (discretion to issue certificate and to hear appeal).
448. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (1982) (certificate of probable cause requirement).
449.

FED.

R.

App.

P.

35.
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289

which courts of appeals perform the correction function, has already been confused by assignment of substantial lawmaking function. Justice Rehnquist's proposal would further diminish the correction function without necessarily improving
the lawmaking function. It would create two levels of discretionary review one too many. Comparison with the Supreme Court and its pure lawmaking
function is inappropriate. 450 A compromise position would apply discretionary
review only in selected areas like diversity cases and administrative appeals of
expert fact finding. 45' Creating these two tracks would formally recognize what
some commentators believe now occurs informally, as less favored categories
452
receive less judicial attention in the appellate screening process already in place.
Proponents of discretionary review in the courts of appeals, such as Chief
Judge Lay of the Eighth Circuit, promise profound benefits. 453 Judicial resources
spent reviewing petitions for discretionary appeal would approximate the present
investment in screening cases for the nonargument calendar. Obviating the full
review of briefs and record, oral argument, and opinion drafting in rejected
appeals would save significant resources over the volume of appeals. Average
delay between notice of appeal and opinion in decided cases would improve.
The threshold determination would help remedy a perceived inequity between
appeals by indigents and paying appellants. Most importantly, all appeals detradiserving of plenary review would receive the full appellate function in a 454
tional deliberative process significantly improved by a reduced calendar.
The proposed system of discretionary review power does not diverge greatly
from the intermediate court's functions of error correction and lawmaking, as
those functions are performed today. Both systems have a gatekeeping feature,
whether it is called screening or petitions for review. 455 Issues of judicial responsibility and staff utilization are common to both systems. 456 Whatever the
ideal solution, the real-world choice is between one appeal as of right, along
with a complex four-level judiciary, or "a system of institutionalized case processing.451

5.

Consolidation of the Intermediate Tier

The direct cause of conflicts among the courts of appeals is not the Supreme
Court's lack of appellate capacity, but rather the individual sovereignty accorded
the coordinate courts of appeals. 458 Two relatively recent innovations, the en
banc court and the doctrine of the law of the circuit, work together to create

450. Carrington, supra note 24, at 572.
451. J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 287; Lumbard, supra note 162, at 32.
452. J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 287-88.
453. Lay, supra note 52, at 1157.
454. Proponents argue that a byproduct of this reform would be a decrease in the number
of second petitions for discretionary review in the Supreme Court. Id. at 1158 n.16.
455. J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at 288.
456. See supra text accompanying notes 212-38.
457. Rubin, supra note 291, at 460 (citation omitted).
458. Note, supra note 6, at 1317.
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a degree of sovereignty akin to the juridical deference afforded state to state,
or nation to state. 45 9 As Congress increased the number of appellate judges,
more multiples of three-judge panels threatened two institutional values: uniformity among panel decisions, and control of the law of the court of appeals
by a majority of its judges. The en banc court comprised of all active judges
developed to preserve these two values. 460 En banc review involves substantial
delay and expends precious judicial resources. Therefore, the rule of interpanel
accord developed to minimize en banc rehearings. This principle obliges a panel
to respect earlier decisions of any panel as binding precedent in the absence
of an intervening en banc or Supreme Court decision. 46' Together, these principles support a balkanized system of precedent; each court of appeals has
become something of a regional supreme court. 462 Forum shopping, one consequence of this system, reduces effectiveness of legal planning and makes possible the odious recent practice of the "race to the courthouse" in administrative
4
appeals. 1
From time to time, a structural proposal has been put forward which would
eliminate altogether the geographical boundaries between courts of appeals. The
unitary court of appeals might maintain regional offices and courthouses, but
would maintain a single calendar and one body of precedent binding its threejudge panels with some provision for a representational selection of en banc
court. 464 Administrative difficulties, however, might prove insurmountable. A
single United States Court of Appeals with nationwide jurisdiction would be
more preferable. 465 However, such a preference does not overcome the concern
for settled expectations and implementation difficulties. Unifying the courts of
appeals would create a profound disturbance of stare decisis. 4 1 More impor467
tantly, a unitary court of appeals simply is not politically possible.
Merely redrawing court boundaries would have the same effect on the present federal appellate crisis that a weatherman's map marks have on the weather.
Compromises are possible, however, which would combine boundary realignment with meaningful structural change. The current hegemony could be par-

459. Id. at 317-18. Elsewhere, the author has traced the evolution of these two innovations.
See generally Baker, supra note 7, at 720-24. Recently, a disquieting problem has appeared which
independently challenges the majority rule principle. As a result of strict compliance with recusal
requirements, a minority of judges on a court of appeals may control the rehearing procedure. See
Harper, The Breakdown in Federal Appeals, 70 A.B.A. J. 56 (1984).
460. Baker, supra note 7, at 723.
461. Id. See also Carrington, supra note 24, at 580.
462. For a review of the negative consequences of this system, see Carrington, supra note 24,
at 596-604.
463. Id. at 598-600. Frequently, the controlling question becomes which party appealed in
which court of appeals first to attach jurisdiction. See id. at 600.
464. Burdick, supra note 59, at 812.
465. See also P. CARRINOTON, supra note 14, at 223.
466. But cf. Baker, supra note 7, at 709-11 (legislating the rules of precedent).
467. Such "ideal solutions are not attainable and. . . political compromise will be essential to
any improvement that comes." P. CARRINOTON, supra note 14, at 223.
468. See supra text accompanying notes 402-14.
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tially undone by creating one permanent national en banc court to replace the
present thirteen, 469 or by authorizing the Supreme Court to refer -cases to existing
en banc courts on a random or rotating basis4 70 for final national decision.
Professor Rosenberg proposes that Congress consolidate existing courts of appeals into a unified administrative and jurisdictional system.4 71 Once consolidated, the federal appellate institution would be arranged in divisions. The
jurisdiction of the current Federal Circuit is one division; the jurisdiction of
the present courts of appeals marks a second division; and a new central division
would include sections divided by functions such as criminal appeals, designated
national law specialties and cases on reference from the Supreme Court.4 72 Professor Rosenberg's far-reaching proposal would achieve dramatic flexibility by
developing a unified court of appeals with many of the features of Professor
Meador's earlier discussed compromise for specialized units within one national
court of appeals.4 73 Although Professor Rosenberg's plan is somewhat utopian,
he is correct in that any meaningful reform must cut through the present forms
and reformulate the structure of the present arrangement of panel and en banc
courts.
One last observation must be made about court of appeals sovereignty and
the hierarchy of the en banc court. The current crisis obliges a reconsideration
of the en banc mechanism and how it performs. Such evaluation is critical to
full consideration of structural reform. 474 Former Chief Judge Kaufman of the
Second Circuit recently delivered a scathing indictment of the en banc proceeding.475 He concluded that in his experience the disadvantages of the en
banc mechanism clearly outweigh the advantages.4 76 Inefficient and wasteful uses

469. Wallace, supra note 90, at 936-40.
470. Id. at 935-36.
471. Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility to Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate System, 59 CORNELL
L. RE V. 576, 591-95 (1974).
472. See Carrington, supra note 24, at 587-96.
473. See supra text accompanying notes 399-401.
474. Chief Judge Feinberg, of the Second Circuit, has offered an agenda:
A careful study of the disposition of requests for en banc hearings in the last decade in
particular circuits might shed light on the following: (a) To what extent do the circuits
differ in their receptivity to convening an en banc court? (b) What should be the criteria?
Are these criteria actually used? (c) Do en bancs accomplish anything in settling doctrine?
It was common knowledge on the Second Circuit that Learned Hand thought they were
a waste of time. Do subsequent panels bow to the new doctrine or tend to find ways to
avoid it in instances where the panel majority disagrees with the conclusions of the en
banc court? (d) How often are en banc decisions relegated to relatively inconsequential
status by prompt Supreme Court intervention? (e) Does the growing size of circuit courts
make the en bane procedure unworkable without substantial change? A detailed analysis
of what has occurred in the [large courts of appeals].. .might be helpful.
Feinberg, Forward: Judicial Administration: Stepchild of the Law, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 187, 190-91
(1978) (footnotes omitted).
475. Remarks by Irving R. Kaufman, The En Banc Proceeding, Second Circuit Judicial Conference (Sept. 14, 1984), revised and reprinted as, Do the Costs of the En Bane Proceeding Outweigh Its
Advantages?, 69 JumcATuRE 7 (1985).
476. Id. at 7.
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of judicial resources include the necessity of. (1) considering motions for rehearing; (2) conferencing; (3) opinion drafting; and (4) arduous consensus build4 7
ing. These tasks are accomplished five times slower than a panel deposition.
The typical result is a majority opinion characterized by careful ambiguity or
a litany of divergent opinions each with one or two subscribers - all in the
4 8
name of uniformity. 1
Perhaps rehearings en banc should be discarded, rather than merely disapproved.4 1 9 If one "law of the circuit" is to prevail, however, some device
must be available to reconcile conflicting panel decisions. Panel rehearing might
provide a sufficient intermediate court second look, as might substitution of
some of the earlier discussed proposals. 480 In the meantime, more specific and en481
forceable guidelines for the proceeding must be developed.
E.

A Postscript

Because the courts of appeals are but an intermediate level of the federal
judicial system, any lasting reform must implicate the system's structure. Adding
judges, the traditional congressional solution, seriously weakens existing structure and function. Techniques for adding capacity to the existing structure seems
to have been exhausted, as existing courts struggle to cope with large contingents
of judges. In addition, experience demonstrates the futility of splitting courts
of appeals. The prospect of specialized courts, without more, holds out little
hope for sustained progress toward the appellate ideal. Proposals hold more
promise than past experience. Reducing demand by narrowing the federal courthouse door or by steering disputants through other doors might provide longterm relief, if jurisdiction reduction and alternative dispute resolution prove
possible. More direct and radical changes are warranted. Adding vertically to
the appellate capacity is an attractive short-term solution and should be pursued
cautiously. Establishing discretionary jurisdiction and challenging conventions of
en banc sovereignty should also be considered.
VI.

CONCLUSION

When the courts of appeals were created, the federal judicial system was a
specialized court system primarily concerned with limited areas of federal concern. 82 As the intermediate level's centennial approaches, pressure for change

477. Id. at 7-8.
478. Id. at 8.
479. Cf. FED. R. App. P. 35(a) ("Rehearings en banc are not favored and ordinarily will not
be granted .... ").
480. Some proposals would preserve the en banc device to prevent intercircuit conflict by
requiring an appeal to be heard en banc when there is an existing intercircuit conflict or when
the panel is disinclined to follow an earlier holding of a sister court of appeals. See Handler, What
to Do with the Supreme Court's Burgeoning Calendars?, 5 CARDOZO L. REv. 249, 273 (1984).
481.
Wald, supra note 29, at 784.
482. Clark, supra note 212, at 148.
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is building. The country's population has increased threefold and the nature
and volume of federal court litigation no more resembles the litigation these
courts were created to meet than the current federal presence resembles that
at the turn of the century. 483 The present structure may no longer be able to
484
The intensity
accommodate this change and continue to meet new demands.
of the discussion about the federal appellate system during the last decade has
increased to the 1891 level; that prior debate precipitated that last major structural change. 485 Some signs indicate that a significant reform will soon break
loose.
A widely shared perception of crisis has emerged. In that context, consider
the foregoing discussion of intramural and extramural reforms, both in place
and proposed. Significant intramural changes have been wrought by judges and
court administrators during the last two decades. These changes have sought
to preserve the appelate ideal from workload threats by adjusting the method
by which courts of appeals perform their traditional role. These measures have
already changed the face of appellate procedures for oral argument, briefing,
opinion preparation, and support staff responsibilities. Little remains to be done
on this level. Remaining intramural proposals, such as the elimination of frivolous appeals, also have serious implications for the appellate ideal. Experiments
and expedients have kept the courts of appeals afloat. Regression is unlikely. 486
The attack of an overwhelming docket has been blunted. But this has not been
accomplished without concomitant threats to the federal appellate function. Ef487
ficiency related procedures have fundamentally changed the courts of appeals.

483. Griswold, supra note 10, at 790.
484. Levin, supra note 60, at 2.
485. Griswold, supra note 10, at 788.
486. On a philosophical level, perhaps, judges, administrators, lawyers, legislators, and
researchers may recognize the virtues of a reform philosophy of experimentation, evaluation,
modification, and change; but in practice there is substantial disparity between [pragmatic]
principles and contemporary appellate court reform.
Currently, techniques that may or may not reduce delay often are not regarded as
experimental mechanisms. Rather they are viewed as "solutions," often monolithic ones,
which should "work," that is, produce the desired effects (preferably immediately) within
the context of any appellate system. All too often, contemporary appellate court reform is
characterized by a process whereby (a) a court selects and implements a technique or a
group of techniques for reducing delay, without first objectively assessing its needs; (b)
the techniques are subjectively rather than objectively evaluated; (c) the techniques are
either viewed as successes and continued as part of standard procedure in the form originally
adopted or are written off as failures and abandoned; and (d) a second court selects and
tries a single technique or group of techniques, and the process continued. Three flaws
in this model of appellate improvement are evident: first, the selection of a technique
without consideration of whether it will actually address the court's problems; second, the
lack of objective analysis and documentation in determining the success or failure of any
particular technique; and third, the failure of courts to exchange information about their
experiences. Thus, under this model, analysis and interchange, fundamental components
of serious appellate court reform, are undoubtedly all too often disregarded entirely.
J. MARTIN & E. PREScorr, supra note 12, at 77-78.
487. See Edwards, supra note 6, at 894.
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To preserve and further what remains of the appellate ideal, Congress must
consider extramural reform. 4"1s Congress, however, has been slow to respond.
Several impediments to congressional court reform must be overcome, including
an agenda full of other national issues, a lack of an influential political constituency, special interest opposition, lawyer and bar negativism, and a lack of
continuity of program and effort. 4 9 Although they are held dear by the profes49
sion, these courts are the ones "nobody knows." 0
Ultimately, reform - real structural reform - must come from Congress.
However, Congress must first contemplate the effect of the courts' efforts to
help themselves and then choose with care among its many options and combinations. Although demands on the courts appear radical and acute, the structural reforms cannot be. 4 9 1 Congress must be above "easy tinkering. 4 9 2 Study
is the key to overcoming imperfect knowledge of the problems, their solutions
and their effects.4 9 ' A long-range perspective is desperately needed. The structural plan must be flexible to meet the changed needs of today and the an49 4
ticipated needs of a long tomorrow.
Congress should not proceed unguided. 4 9 A blue ribbon commission should
study the problems of the federal judicial institution and particularly the problems of the courts of appeals. 96 Structural reform best proceeds from such study
and dialogue. 49 ' The study should draw on the formidable resources of the
Administrative Office for the Federal Courts, the American Bar Association,
the American Law Institute, the Department of Justice, the Federal Judicial
Center, the Judicial Conference of the United States, and the Judiciary Com-

488. This assumes that appeals merit preservation. But see Wilner, Civil Appeals: Are 7ey Useful
in the Administration of Justice?, 56 GEo. L.J. 417 (1968); supra text accompanying notes 444-48
(abolish).
489. Meador, supra note 37, at 637-41.
490. J. HOWARD, supra note 31, at xvii (quoting S. WASBY, EXTRA JUDGES IN "THE COURT
NOBODY KNOWS": SOME ASPECTS of DEcISION MAKING IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS

1 (1975)).
491.
This is important. "The changes in the demands on the courts will be radical. The
response of the procedural reformers is not likely to be. For this reason alone, procedural reform
is not going to be the answer to all future needs." Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its
Future, I GA. L. REv. 563, 575 (1967).
492. Levin, supra note 60, at 2.
493. Wright, supra note 491, at 578.
494. After all, the process seems cyclical at centuries. See Burdick, supra note 59, at 815.
495. Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 85.
496. Burger, supra note 424, at 447; Rehnquist, supra note 6, at 6-7. See generally Hill & Baker,
supra note 68, at 85-87. See also S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1982 U S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 11, 13. "No single change in the organization, procedure, or jurisdiction

of the Courts of Appeals could substantially reduce congestion of their dockets unless the change
were so dramatic that it would also effect major change in their function in the federal system."
ABA REPORT ON ACCOMMODATING T'HE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 1
(1968).
497. Note, supra note 6, at 1324. See generally Cannon & Cikins, Interbraneh Cooperation in Improving
the Administration of Justice: A Major Innovation, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1981).
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mittees of both Houses of Congress.4 9 8 Above all, the study must not lose sight
of the purpose of our federal judicial institution. Chief Justice Burger said it
best: "We must constantly keep in mind that the duty of lawyers and the
function of judges is to deliver the best quality of justice at the least cost in
the shortest time.

499

498. Hill & Baker, supra note 68, at 85-86.
499. Speech by Chief Justice Burger, ABA Annual Meeting (Aug. 14, 1972), quoted in 63
F.R.D. 465 (1974).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1985

71

Florida Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 2

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol37/iss2/2

72

